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Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments

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Type: Journal Article
Author: Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred; Stribeck, Agnes
Journal: Games
Volume: 1
Page(s): 89-102
Date: 2010
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6824
Sector: Theory
Subject(s): equity
game theory
Abstract: "In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded or imposed. We predict that the latter crowds out - or at least weakens - efficiency seeking. Our treatments rely on a 2x3 factorial design, differing in whether the responder or the third (dummy) player is the residual claimant and whether the proposer’s agreement payoff is larger, equal, or smaller than the other exogenously given agreement payoff."

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