A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons

Found at: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6939
PDF
Type:	Working Paper
Author:	Koczy, László Á.
Date:	2002
Agency:	Centre for Economic Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
Series:	Discussion Paper, no. 02.17
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6939
Sector:	Theory
Region:
Subject(s):	game theory tragedy of the commons--models simulations common pool resources--models
Abstract:	"In the model of Funaki and Yamato (1999) the tragedy of the commons can be avoided with pessimistic players, while this does not hold for optimistic players. We propose a new core concept to overcome this puzzle and provide numerical simulations of simple games where the conclusions coincide or are less sensitive to behavioural assumptions."

Files in this item

Files	Size	Format	View
Dps0217.pdf	419.3Kb	PDF	View/Open