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A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons

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Type: Working Paper
Author: Koczy, László Á.
Date: 2002
Agency: Centre for Economic Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
Series: Discussion Paper, no. 02.17
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6939
Sector: Theory
Subject(s): game theory
tragedy of the commons--models
common pool resources--models
Abstract: "In the model of Funaki and Yamato (1999) the tragedy of the commons can be avoided with pessimistic players, while this does not hold for optimistic players. We propose a new core concept to overcome this puzzle and provide numerical simulations of simple games where the conclusions coincide or are less sensitive to behavioural assumptions."

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