Image Database Export Citations


Anti-Norm Agreements: Collusion Against the Sanctioning Mechanism

Show full item record

Type: Conference Paper
Author: Autto, H.
Conference: Sustaining Commons: Sustaining Our Future, the Thirteenth Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of the Commons
Location: Hyderabad, India
Conf. Date: January 10-14
Date: 2011
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/7108
Sector: Social Organization
Subject(s): norms
common pool resources
Abstract: "This working paper defines and studies anti-norm agreements. Anti-norm agreements are agreements of mutual no-sanctioning between some actors in the norm community. These agreements make it possible for all agreement parties to deviate from the norm. Using James Coleman’s formalization we show that anti-norm agreements are never efficient against the norm under perfect social system. However, when the assumption of perfect social system is dropped anti-norms can be efficient against the norm. We report preliminary simulation results on how vulnerable a simple sanctioning mechanism is against anti-norm agreements. Population dispersion is identified as a key theoretical variable. Finally, results are discussed in light of common-pool resource studies. We suggest how some combinations of empirical variables might lead to this type of enforcement problems."

Files in this item

Files Size Format View
849.pdf 104.7Kb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following document type(s)

Show full item record