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PDF
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Type:
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Conference Paper |
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Author:
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Autto, H. |
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Conference:
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Sustaining Commons: Sustaining Our Future, the Thirteenth Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of the Commons |
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Location:
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Hyderabad, India |
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Conf. Date:
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January 10-14 |
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Date:
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2011 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/7108
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Sector:
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Social Organization |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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norms
enforcement
common pool resources
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Abstract:
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"This working paper defines and studies anti-norm agreements. Anti-norm
agreements are agreements of mutual no-sanctioning between some actors in the norm community. These agreements make it possible for all agreement parties to deviate from the norm. Using James Coleman’s formalization we show that anti-norm agreements are never efficient against the norm under perfect social system. However, when the assumption of perfect social system is dropped anti-norms can be efficient against the norm. We report preliminary simulation results on how vulnerable a simple sanctioning mechanism is against anti-norm agreements. Population dispersion is identified as a key theoretical variable. Finally, results are discussed in light of common-pool resource studies. We suggest how some combinations of empirical variables might lead to this type of enforcement problems."
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