| dc.contributor.author |
Autto, H. |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2011-03-16T17:35:40Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2011-03-16T17:35:40Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2011 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/7108 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"This working paper defines and studies anti-norm agreements. Anti-norm
agreements are agreements of mutual no-sanctioning between some actors in the norm community. These agreements make it possible for all agreement parties to deviate from the norm. Using James Coleman’s formalization we show that anti-norm agreements are never efficient against the norm under perfect social system. However, when the assumption of perfect social system is dropped anti-norms can be efficient against the norm. We report preliminary simulation results on how vulnerable a simple sanctioning mechanism is against anti-norm agreements. Population dispersion is identified as a key theoretical variable. Finally, results are discussed in light of common-pool resource studies. We suggest how some combinations of empirical variables might lead to this type of enforcement problems." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
norms |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
enforcement |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
common pool resources |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Anti-Norm Agreements: Collusion Against the Sanctioning Mechanism |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Conference Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
unpublished |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Social Organization |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconference |
Sustaining Commons: Sustaining Our Future, the Thirteenth Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of the Commons |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
January 10-14 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
Hyderabad, India |
en_US |