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PDF
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Type:
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Conference Paper |
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Author:
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Kimmich, C. |
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Conference:
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Sustaining Commons: Sustaining Our Future, the Thirteenth Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of the Commons |
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Location:
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Hyderabad, India |
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Conf. Date:
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January 10-14 |
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Date:
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2011 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/7328
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Sector:
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Theory |
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Region:
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Middle East & South Asia |
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Subject(s):
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irrigation
social dilemmas
game theory
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Abstract:
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"The dilemma structure underlying common-pool resource governance may prevail due to irreconcilable interests of actors, and may involve uncertainties resulting from the resource or actors involved. This paper addresses the knowledge and uncertainty problem in an analysis of electricity infrastructure governance for agricultural irrigation in Andhra Pradesh. Flat-rate electricity provision has resulted in deteriorating infrastructure maintenance. Absent marginal costs and low electricity quality have led to the use of inefficient pump-set technology, further reducing electricity quality in the grid. This has navigated agriculture and the utility into a vicious circle with frequent appliance burn-outs incurring high repair costs. The analysis is based on interviews and a survey and built on a game-theoretic assurance model. The interviews indicate that many farmers are not aware of the interdependence of their individual actions, or ascribe the problem to the utility. The risk-dominant strategy prevails. A coordinated solution requires overcoming resource uncertainties and a credible commitment between the farmers and the utility."
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