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PDF
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Type:
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Journal Article |
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Author:
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Acheson, James M.; Gardner, Roy |
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Journal:
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Ecology and Society |
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Volume:
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16 |
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Page(s):
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Date:
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2011 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/7584
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Sector:
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Theory
Water Resource & Irrigation |
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Region:
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North America |
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Subject(s):
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game theory
lobster
prisoner's dilemma
game theory
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Abstract:
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"The Maine lobster industry is experiencing record high catches because, in all probability,
of an effective management program. One of the most important conservation measures is the V-notch
program that allows fishermen to conserve proven breeding females by notching the tails of egg-bearing
lobsters. Such marked lobsters may never be taken. Although thousands of lobster fishermen participate,
it is a voluntary practice. The genesis of this practice is not easily explained, because V-notching poses a
prisoners dilemma problem that gives fishermen an incentive to avoid the practice. The most common
explanations for ways to overcome prisoners dilemma problems will not work in the case of the V-notch.
An unusual combination of factors explains the V-notch program: (1) a strong belief among those in the
industry that the V-notch is effective in conserving the lobster stock; (2) a low discount rate because the
long-term gains from V-notching are higher than the one-time gain from defection; (3) a gain in reputation
for those who V-notch. At the start of the 20th century, fishermen did not V-notch; by the end of the century,
V-notching was common. We explain the change in strategies using a three-parameter evolutionary model
that emphasizes the importance of culture change."
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