| dc.contributor.author |
Falk, Thomas |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Lohmann, Dirk |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Azebaze, Nadege |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Kruger, Bertus |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Kirk, Michael |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2011-11-10T20:47:03Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2011-11-10T20:47:03Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2011 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/7689 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"Achieving cooperation in natural resource management is always a challenge when incentives exist
for an individual to maximise her short term benefits at the cost of a group. Various case studies
demonstrated, however, that cooperation is possible to achieve. We assess the example of
cooperation in water supply in land reform projects in Namibia. In the context of the Namibian land
reform, beneficiaries share the operation and maintenance of water infrastructure in order to gain
economies of scale. Taking a broad summary of the socio-ecological system as a starting point we
assess how alternative fairness norms affect the probability of cooperation.
We applied diverse complementary methods i.e. framework based explorative assessments, theory,
ecological-economic modelling, and economic experiments in order to understand the cooperation
challenges of Namibian land reform beneficiaries. In particular the simulation model based
experiments produced not only knowledge but provided support to stakeholders in their decision
making and institution building.
Our study provides evidence that different fairness norms overlap. Land reform beneficiaries increase
their contributions as the other group members increase their payments, as they are more productive
and as they own more livestock. Different people carry simultaneously different fairness norms and
make decisions considering the overall context. This means at the same time that a person who does
not follow a particular fairness norm is not necessarily only materially self-interested." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
water management |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
land tenure and use |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
ecological economics--models |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
cooperation |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
livestock |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
rangelands |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Incentives to Cooperate and Fairness Norms in the Provision of Water: Cases of Namibian Land Reform Projects |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Conference Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
unpublished |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.coverage.region |
Africa |
en_US |
| dc.coverage.country |
Namibia |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Grazing |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Water Resource & Irrigation |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconference |
Shared Resources in a Rapidly Changing World, European Regional Conference of the International Association for the Study of the Commons |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
September 14-17 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
Agricultural University, Plovdiv, Bulgaria |
en_US |