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Incentives to Cooperate and Fairness Norms in the Provision of Water: Cases of Namibian Land Reform Projects

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dc.contributor.author Falk, Thomas
dc.contributor.author Lohmann, Dirk
dc.contributor.author Azebaze, Nadege
dc.contributor.author Kruger, Bertus
dc.contributor.author Kirk, Michael
dc.date.accessioned 2011-11-10T20:47:03Z
dc.date.available 2011-11-10T20:47:03Z
dc.date.issued 2011 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/7689
dc.description.abstract "Achieving cooperation in natural resource management is always a challenge when incentives exist for an individual to maximise her short term benefits at the cost of a group. Various case studies demonstrated, however, that cooperation is possible to achieve. We assess the example of cooperation in water supply in land reform projects in Namibia. In the context of the Namibian land reform, beneficiaries share the operation and maintenance of water infrastructure in order to gain economies of scale. Taking a broad summary of the socio-ecological system as a starting point we assess how alternative fairness norms affect the probability of cooperation. We applied diverse complementary methods i.e. framework based explorative assessments, theory, ecological-economic modelling, and economic experiments in order to understand the cooperation challenges of Namibian land reform beneficiaries. In particular the simulation model based experiments produced not only knowledge but provided support to stakeholders in their decision making and institution building. Our study provides evidence that different fairness norms overlap. Land reform beneficiaries increase their contributions as the other group members increase their payments, as they are more productive and as they own more livestock. Different people carry simultaneously different fairness norms and make decisions considering the overall context. This means at the same time that a person who does not follow a particular fairness norm is not necessarily only materially self-interested." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject water management en_US
dc.subject land tenure and use en_US
dc.subject ecological economics--models en_US
dc.subject cooperation en_US
dc.subject livestock en_US
dc.subject rangelands en_US
dc.title Incentives to Cooperate and Fairness Norms in the Provision of Water: Cases of Namibian Land Reform Projects en_US
dc.type Conference Paper en_US
dc.type.published unpublished en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.coverage.region Africa en_US
dc.coverage.country Namibia en_US
dc.subject.sector Grazing en_US
dc.subject.sector Water Resource & Irrigation en_US
dc.identifier.citationconference Shared Resources in a Rapidly Changing World, European Regional Conference of the International Association for the Study of the Commons en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdates September 14-17 en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfloc Agricultural University, Plovdiv, Bulgaria en_US

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