| dc.contributor.author |
Carraro, Carlo |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2012-07-12T15:10:14Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2012-07-12T15:10:14Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2001 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8125 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"This paper provides some examples of how institution design affects the emergence of co-operative international agreements to manage global commons. The paper shows how different accession rules, minimum participation rules and negotiation rules affect a country's decision to sign or not to sign a treaty to protect a global common. The paper also analyses what would be the outcome of the negotiations when treaty design (e.g. the minimum participation rule or the negotiation agenda) is endogenised and strategically chosen by the negotiating countries." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
global commons |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
institutional design |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
international treaties |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
rules |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
negotiation--international |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Institutions Design for Managing Global Commons |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Conference Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
unpublished |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Global Commons |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconference |
Property Rights, Institutions, and Management of Environmental and Natural Resources, the Fourth Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resource Economics |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
May 3-4 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
Toulouse, France |
en_US |