| dc.contributor.author |
Berge, Erling |
en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned |
2009-07-31T14:32:23Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2009-07-31T14:32:23Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1992 |
en_US |
| dc.date.submitted |
2007-09-06 |
en_US |
| dc.date.submitted |
2007-09-06 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/813 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"The game of chicken is seen as a simplified model of the structure of decision making in an open access resource. The discussion starts at the point where its users realize that population pressure or some equivalent external shock has made the utilization obviously unsustainable. To escape this social trap, the appropriators have to "invent" a local state to govern the appropriation process. Rational decision makers then have to consider transaction costs, externalities, distributional consequences and the distribution of social power. Some sequences of decisions may turn the game of chicken into a prisoners dilemma. The discussion is aimed at identifying necessary conditions the local state must satisfy in order to ensure a sustainable resource utilization. Democracy and human rights appears to be necessary." |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
common pool resources--theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
sustainability--theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
game theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
chicken game |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
prisoner's dilemma |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
IASC |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Democracy and Human Rights as Conditions for Sustainable Resource Utilization |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Conference Paper |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
General & Multiple Resources |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconference |
Inequality and the Commons, the Third Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
September 17-20, 1992 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
Washington, DC |
en_US |
| dc.submitter.email |
rshivakoti@yahoo.com |
en_US |