| dc.contributor.author |
Ostmann, Axel |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Wojtyniak, Beate |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Beckenkamp, Martin |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2012-07-23T19:32:31Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2012-07-23T19:32:31Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1999 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8218 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"Commons are institutions that induce a kind of social dilemma, a 'situation in which private interests are at odds with the collective interests'. Often a group of members manage a common pool resource like fish, meadow, forest or water. The members of a common are competitors in use: What one user takes affects the chances for other users. Under the assumption of rational actors game-theoretical analyses of such commons prescribe an overuse of the resource for a large and relevant class of situations. There are static and dynamic environments." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
Workshop |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
game theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
common pool resources--theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
monitoring and sanctioning--theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
uncertainty--theory |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Comparing and Explaining the Success of a Common Endowed with Different Degrees of Sanctioning |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Conference Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
unpublished |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconference |
Workshop on the Workshop 2 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
June 9-13 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN |
en_US |