| dc.contributor.author |
Ostrom, Elinor |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2012-07-23T19:46:59Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2012-07-23T19:46:59Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1993 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8221 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"Ignoring the impact on a form of social capital--the rules used in farmer-organized irrigation systems--of changes in physical capital can lead to the unintended consequences that the physical capital is not as productive as intended. Analysis focuses on the choice of rules made by farmers in symmetric and asymmetric situations. Using this analysis, it is possible to illustrate why many donor-funded improvements in physical capital have had counterproductive impacts." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
Workshop |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
collective action |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
social capital |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
common pool resources |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
rules |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
institutional analysis--IAD framework |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Conference Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
unpublished |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Water Resource & Irrigation |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconference |
Heterogeneity and Collective Action |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
October 14-17 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN |
en_US |