The Origins of Institutions for Collective Action in Common-Pool Resource Situations

Found at: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8222
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Type:	Conference Paper
Author:	Ostrom, Elinor
Conference:	Common Property Resource Management, Board on Science and Technology for International Development (BOSTID)
Location:	National Academy of Sciences / National Research Council, Washington, DC
Conf. Date:	September 4
Date:	1985
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8222
Sector:	Theory
Region:
Subject(s):	Workshop collective action common pool resources institutional analysis tragedy of the commons Hardin, Garrett Olson, Mancur
Abstract:	"Considerable attention has been paid by the authors of the case studies to the problems of collective action in relation to common-pool resources. Accepted theories of collective action appear to conclude that individuals using a common-pool resource are locked into a struggle leading to the destruction of the very resource on which their livelihood depends. Several cases, however, have described situations where individuals using a common-pool resource have devised their own customs or rules to limit individual actions in ways that avoid the tragedy of the commons. Other cases illustrate what the accepted theories predict--resource systems that are over-used and whose capability to sustain a productive flow of resource units into the future is seriously endangered."

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