| dc.contributor.author |
Ostrom, Elinor |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2012-07-23T19:50:38Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2012-07-23T19:50:38Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1985 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8222 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"Considerable attention has been paid by the authors of the case studies to the problems of collective action in relation to common-pool resources. Accepted theories of collective action appear to conclude that individuals using a common-pool resource are locked into a struggle leading to the destruction of the very resource on which their livelihood depends. Several cases, however, have described situations where individuals using a common-pool resource have devised their own customs or rules to limit individual actions in ways that avoid the tragedy of the commons. Other cases illustrate what the accepted theories predict--resource systems that are over-used and whose capability to sustain a productive flow of resource units into the future is seriously endangered." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
Workshop |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
collective action |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
common pool resources |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
institutional analysis |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
tragedy of the commons |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
Hardin, Garrett |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
Olson, Mancur |
en_US |
| dc.title |
The Origins of Institutions for Collective Action in Common-Pool Resource Situations |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Conference Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
unpublished |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconference |
Common Property Resource Management, Board on Science and Technology for International Development (BOSTID) |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
September 4 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
National Academy of Sciences / National Research Council, Washington, DC |
en_US |