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PDF
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Type:
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Conference Paper |
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Author:
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Oye, Kenneth A.; Maxwell, James H. |
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Conference:
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Heterogeneity and Collective Action |
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Location:
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Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN |
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Conf. Date:
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October 14-17 |
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Date:
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1993 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8230
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Sector:
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Global Commons
Theory |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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common pool resources
regulation
global commons
Workshop
self-interest
fisheries
water resources
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Abstract:
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"This paper offers a moderately optimistic view on the management of Common Pool Resources (CPR). We argue that a central problem of CPR management is to bring about a convergence of narrow self-interest and the common good. In what could be termed 'Stiglerian' situations, that convergence is a natural byproduct of cartelization by regulation. The phenomenon of regulatory capture may advance the general interest in effective management of CPRs, albeit at the expense of world be entrants and/or consumers. In what could be termed 'Olsonian' situations, that convergence must be created by buying off powerful potential losers that would otherwise undercut systems of regulation. In short, our optimism on CPR management derives from the perverse observation that general environmental concerns are being advanced through particularistic pursuit of rents and subsidies."
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