| dc.contributor.author |
Underdal, Arild |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2012-07-27T15:50:13Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2012-07-27T15:50:13Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1991 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8277 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"What can be accomplished through collective decision-making processes may generally be seen as a function of three basic determinants: the institutional setting (determing the set of actors, the agenda, the venue and time of meetings, and the 'rules of the game'), the configuration of actor preferences, and the total amount as well as the distribution of relevant political resources, including the elusive asset of skill. In exploring the political feasibility of a potential solution, we normally accept all these factors as exogenously determined, and ask three main questions (1) What are the minimal requirements that a solution shall have to meet in order to be adopted and implemented under these circumstances? (2) What is the maximum that we can hope to accomplish? (3) How would we design a solution if our only concern were to maximize its chances of being adopted and implemented?" |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
global commons |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Designing Politically Feasible Solutions |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Conference Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
unpublished |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Global Commons |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconference |
XVth World Congress of the International Political Science Association |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
July 21-25 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
Buenos Aires |
en_US |