| dc.contributor.author |
Pérez, Irene |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Baggio, Jacopo A. |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Rollins, Nathan D. |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Janssen, Marco A. |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-01-07T15:18:23Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-01-07T15:18:23Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2012 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8660 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"This paper is a study of collective action in asymmetric access to a common resource. An example is an irrigation system with upstream and downstream resource users. While both contribute to the maintenance of the common infrastructure, the upstream participant has rst access to the resource. Results of our two-player asymmetric commons game show that privileged resource access player invest more than the downstream players. Investments by the downstream player into the common resource are rewarded by a higher share from the common resource by the upstream player. Decisions are mainly explained by the levels of trust and trustworthiness. Introducing uncertainty in the production function of the common resource did not aect the results in a significant way." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
CSID Working Paper Series, no. CSID-2012-012 |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
common pool resources |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Cooperation in Asymmetric Commons Dilemmas |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Social Organization |
en_US |