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Cooperation in Asymmetric Commons Dilemmas

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dc.contributor.author Pérez, Irene
dc.contributor.author Baggio, Jacopo A.
dc.contributor.author Rollins, Nathan D.
dc.contributor.author Janssen, Marco A.
dc.date.accessioned 2013-01-07T15:18:23Z
dc.date.available 2013-01-07T15:18:23Z
dc.date.issued 2012 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8660
dc.description.abstract "This paper is a study of collective action in asymmetric access to a common resource. An example is an irrigation system with upstream and downstream resource users. While both contribute to the maintenance of the common infrastructure, the upstream participant has rst access to the resource. Results of our two-player asymmetric commons game show that privileged resource access player invest more than the downstream players. Investments by the downstream player into the common resource are rewarded by a higher share from the common resource by the upstream player. Decisions are mainly explained by the levels of trust and trustworthiness. Introducing uncertainty in the production function of the common resource did not aect the results in a significant way." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries CSID Working Paper Series, no. CSID-2012-012 en_US
dc.subject common pool resources en_US
dc.title Cooperation in Asymmetric Commons Dilemmas en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ en_US
dc.subject.sector Social Organization en_US

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