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Conditional Behavior Affects the Level of Evolved Cooperation in Public Good Games

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dc.contributor.author Janssen, Marco A.
dc.contributor.author Manning, Miles
dc.contributor.author Udiani, Oyita
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-30T18:01:25Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-30T18:01:25Z
dc.date.issued 2013 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/9131
dc.description.abstract "Human societies are unique in the level of cooperation among non-kin. Evolutionary models explaining this behavior typically assume pure strategies of cooperation and defection. Behavioral experiments, however, demonstrate that humans are typically conditional co-operators who have other-regarding preferences. Building on existing models on the evolution of cooperation and costly punishment, we use a utilitarian formulation of agent decision making to explore conditions that support the emergence of cooperative behavior. Our results indicate that cooperation levels are significantly lower for larger groups in contrast to the original pure strategy model. Here, defection behavior not only diminishes the public good, but also affects the expectations of group members leading conditional co-operators to change their strategies. Hence defection has a more damaging effect when decisions are based on expectations and not only pure strategies." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries CSID Working Paper Series, no. CSID-2013-007 en_US
dc.subject public goods and bads en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject cooperation en_US
dc.title Conditional Behavior Affects the Level of Evolved Cooperation in Public Good Games en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US

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