Institutional Rules and Legislative Outcomes: A Look at the Influence of Chamber Size in the State Legislatures

Found at: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/9324
PDF
Type:	Conference Paper
Author:	Winburn, Jonathan
Conference:	Institutional Analysis and Development Mini-Conference and TransCoop Meeting
Location:	Bloomington, Indiana
Conf. Date:	December
Date:	2002
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/9324
Sector:	Social Organization
Region:	North America
Subject(s):	incentives rules legislature institutional design institutional analysis
Abstract:	"The paper proceeds as follows. The first section lays out a theoretical argument that suggests smaller chambers, in general, and upper chambers, more specifically, offer more benefits to legislators. I discuss the issue institutionally from a bicameral perspective and then discuss how this institutional variation may structure member behavior of not only ambitious politicians looking to limb up the political power ladder but also for those career politicians who make their home in the state capitals. In the second section, I specifically examine the hypotheses derived from the previous discussion. I then lay out the analysis undertaken and the data used, and test several indicators of legislator preference between the chambers. A discussion of the results follows with a concluding section focused on the implications of my findings and potential extensions of this research."

Files in this item

Files	Size	Format	View
Winburn.pdf	699.5Kb	PDF	View/Open