Social Networks and Institutions in Self-Governance Systems: Water Supply Management in Northwestern Senegal

Abstract

"The present paper describes the management of a Common Pool Resource through a group characterized by distrust among actors, and discrimination or disadvantages of actors with regard to the infrastructure and positions in an elected institution. A community of seven villages in the Northwestern of Senegal manages its water supply through an elected board representative of each village. The villagers are composed of Wolof and Fulani. The former are mainly peasants, while the latter nomads. The Fulani complained about disadvantages in the use of the resource and a weak representativity in the board. Although they threatened repeatedly to depose the board, they still cooperate in the management of the resource, paying regularly the water use fees. The question is also to find out why subgroups that are or feel segregated contribute positively to the management of Common Pool resources. Results of this paper are that: the discriminated subgroup cooperates fully because the fragmentation observed on the group level is not reflected in the institution; the discriminated subgroup hardly succeeds in implementing its interests, because it is characterized itself by intern discrepancies; segregation occurs at the level of the whole group, but the institution remains rather integrative. The group structure is derived from social networks collected in the whole group (462 respondents) and in the institution (33 members) to compare subgroup behaviors according to language background and location at both levels."