Financial Transfers to Sustain Cooperative International Optimality in Stock Pollutant Abatement

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dc.contributor.authorGermain, Marc
dc.contributor.authorToint, Philippe
dc.contributor.authorTulkens, Henry
dc.contributor.editorFaucheux, S.
dc.contributor.editorGowdy, J.
dc.contributor.editorNicolai, I.
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-26T19:34:27Z
dc.date.available2010-05-26T19:34:27Z
dc.date.issued1998en_US
dc.description.abstract"It is well known that the transnational character of many environmental problems (for example, greenhouse gas emissions, acid rain, pollution of international waters) requires cooperation among the countries involved if a social optimum is to be achieved. The issues raised thereby have often been addressed, in the economic literature, using concepts borrowed from cooperative game theory."en_US
dc.identifier.citationpages205-219en_US
dc.identifier.citationpublocCheltenhamen_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10535/5784
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.publisherEdward Elgaren_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseriesCenter for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Catholic University of Louvain, Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgiumen_US
dc.relation.ispartofSustainability and Firms: Technological Change and the Changing Regulatory Environmenten_US
dc.subjectsimulationsen_US
dc.subjectcooperation--modelsen_US
dc.subjectinternational relationsen_US
dc.subjectpollutionen_US
dc.subject.sectorGlobal Commonsen_US
dc.subject.sectorTheoryen_US
dc.titleFinancial Transfers to Sustain Cooperative International Optimality in Stock Pollutant Abatementen_US
dc.typeBook Chapteren_US
dc.type.methodologyModelingen_US
dc.type.publishedpublisheden_US

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