Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games

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dc.contributor.authorBarelli, Paulo
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-12T20:13:25Z
dc.date.available2011-01-12T20:13:25Z
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.description.abstract"We introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi) and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions."en_US
dc.identifier.citationjournalGamesen_US
dc.identifier.citationpages415-421en_US
dc.identifier.citationvolume1en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10535/6756
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.subjecthierarchyen_US
dc.subjectepistemologyen_US
dc.subjectcommonsen_US
dc.subjectequilibriumen_US
dc.subject.sectorTheoryen_US
dc.titleConsistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Gamesen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.type.methodologyCase Studyen_US
dc.type.publishedpublisheden_US

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