Non-Transferable Utility Values of Voting Games

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dc.contributor.authorGardner, Roy
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-02T20:24:35Z
dc.date.available2009-09-02T20:24:35Z
dc.date.issued1987en_US
dc.description.abstract"A voting game is a non-transferable utility (NTU) game with a simple game structure. When the Shapley-Shubik index of a simple game is strictly positive, then the corresponding voting game has a strict NTU value. Moreover, the Shapley-Shubik index is the unique NTU value for a certain class of voting games. These results lead to a solution of the problem of a group choosing its leader."en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10535/4723
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesW87-19en_US
dc.subjectgame theoryen_US
dc.subjectvotingen_US
dc.subjectsocial choice theoryen_US
dc.subjectWorkshopen_US
dc.subject.sectorTheoryen_US
dc.titleNon-Transferable Utility Values of Voting Gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.type.methodologyGame Theoryen_US

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