The Power and Limitations of Proportional Cutbacks in Common-Pool Resources

dc.contributor.authorGardner, Roy
dc.contributor.authorHerr, Andrew
dc.contributor.authorOstrom, Elinor
dc.contributor.authorWalker, James M.
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-23T21:24:10Z
dc.date.available2009-11-23T21:24:10Z
dc.date.issued1998en_US
dc.description.abstract"This paper examines the success and limitations of proportional cutbacks as an allocation rule for improving the performance of common pool resources (CPRs). Two field cases, one success and one failure, motivate the analysis. For symmetric CPRs, we establish the existence of efficiency-enhancing proportional cutbacks. We then introduce complications that arise in the presence of asymmetries, where there are high value types and low value types. This asymmetry induces a continuum of proportional cutbacks that raise efficiency above Nash equilibrium. Calibrating a linear-quadratic CPR model to global carbon dioxide emissions, the efficiency and distributional consequences of proportional cutbacks like those embodied in the Kyoto Protocol are derived."en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10535/5210
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseriesWorkshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, INen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorkshop Working Paper Series no. W98-31en_US
dc.subjectcommon pool resources--theoryen_US
dc.subjectWorkshopen_US
dc.subjectgame theoryen_US
dc.subject.sectorTheoryen_US
dc.titleThe Power and Limitations of Proportional Cutbacks in Common-Pool Resourcesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.type.methodologyCase Studyen_US

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