Endogenous Property Rights Regimes, Common Pool Resources and Trade

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dc.contributor.authorGalinato, Gregmar I.
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-01T18:48:56Z
dc.date.available2010-10-01T18:48:56Z
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.description.abstract"This paper analyzes the impact of trade on resource stocks through endogenously selected property rights regimes. We present a model that shows welfare can be maximized when a community degrades its resource stock under optimally selected property rights regimes after opening to trade. Results from a laboratory experiment show that labor allocations, property rights regimes and resource stock levels do not follow the optimal dynamic Nash equilibrium path. Instead a non-optimal dynamic equilibrium path is selected due to incorrect initial labor allocation and property rights regime choices."en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10535/6450
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.subjectproperty rightsen_US
dc.subjectresource managementen_US
dc.subjectcommon pool resourcesen_US
dc.subject.sectorSocial Organizationen_US
dc.titleEndogenous Property Rights Regimes, Common Pool Resources and Tradeen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.type.methodologyCase Studyen_US

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