Simulating Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem

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dc.contributor.authorEyckmans, Johan
dc.contributor.authorTulkens, Henry
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-15T15:27:53Z
dc.date.available2012-06-15T15:27:53Z
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.description.abstract"The CLIMNEG World Simulation (CWS) model is introduced here for simulating cooperative game theoretic aspects of global climate negotiations. The CWS model is derived from the seminal RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996). We first state the necessary conditions that determine Pareto efficient investment and emission abatement paths under alternative regimes of cooperation between the regions. We then show with a numerical version of the CWS model that the transfer scheme advocated by Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997) induces an allocation in the ('gamma') core of the world carbon emission abatement cooperative game."en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdatesMay 3-4en_US
dc.identifier.citationconferenceProperty Rights, Institutions, and Management of Environmental and Natural Resources, the Fourth Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resource Economicsen_US
dc.identifier.citationconflocToulouse, Franceen_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10535/7988
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.subjectgame theoryen_US
dc.subjectclimate change--modelsen_US
dc.subjectcooperation--internationalen_US
dc.subjectenvironmental economicsen_US
dc.subjectsimulationsen_US
dc.subject.sectorGlobal Commonsen_US
dc.titleSimulating Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problemen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.type.methodologyTheoryen_US
dc.type.publishedunpublisheden_US

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