Cooperation and Institutional Arrangements

dc.contributor.authorShepsle, Kenneth A.
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-03T21:45:34Z
dc.date.available2010-02-03T21:45:34Z
dc.date.issued1986en_US
dc.description.abstract"The formal study of cooperation is something of a cottage industry these days in political science, primarily because it is central to so many vital issues. These issues, of course, are not new. Rousseau's famous 'stag hunt dilemma,' Hume's "worry over commons problems and public goods supply (as in neighbors draining a meadow), and Hobbes's generalized concern over how human societies might avoid the dire consequences of life in the state of nature, all suggest that voluntary cooperation in social settings is a commodity in considerable demand and, presumably, In short supply. Some, like Hobbes, have made this disparity between the demand for and the supply of voluntary cooperation the basis of an elaborate rationale for authoritative coercion In the form of the State."en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdatesFebruary 13-15, 1986en_US
dc.identifier.citationconferenceHarvard Conference on International Regimes and Cooperationen_US
dc.identifier.citationconflocDedham, MAen_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10535/5476
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.subjectinstitutional designen_US
dc.subjectcooperationen_US
dc.subjectgame theoryen_US
dc.subject.sectorTheoryen_US
dc.titleCooperation and Institutional Arrangementsen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.type.methodologyCase Studyen_US
dc.type.publishedunpublisheden_US

Files

Original bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
cooperation and institutional arrangements.pdf
Size:
174.34 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format

Collections