Collective Action in Social Dilemmas: The Impact of Group Identification on the Selection and Cooperation with Leaders

Abstract

"Two experimental studies investigated the role of group identification in the selection and cooperation with a leader to manage a public good dilemma. The findings of the first study revealed that there was a general preference to select leaders with a legitimate power base (i.e., democratic, elected, and internal, rather than autocratic, appointed, and external leaders), but these preferences were particularly pronounced when people's identification with their group was high rather than low. The second study complemented these findings by showing that when group identification was high a relational leader (i.e., who builds positive intragroup relations) was as efficient as an instrumental leader (i.e., who punishes noncontributing members) in raising contributions. However, when group identification was low an instrumental leader appeared to be far more effective. These findings suggest that effectiveness of leaders in managing social dilemmas will depend upon the match between characteristics of the leader and group."

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Keywords

collective action, leadership, social dilemmas, monitoring and sanctioning, social networks

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