CPR Institutions: Game Theory Constructs and Empirical Relevance

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2003

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Abstract

"This paper is based on my experience of blending theoretical methods with field-based methods for understanding collective action on the commons. The workshop proposal includes as a point of inquiry, '...how theoretical methods and field-based methods can best be blended.' Unlike anthropology, where field-based methods are systematized, the economists talk at the most of field experiences. There is a big difference between experience and method. What may be a field-based method for economists? Economists work with models. Not only realities in field are approximated by modifications of models but also models may be chosen to cater to the needs of the field, for policy or for other purposes. I feel model making, fitting it better to the reality and choosing models to respond to field needs is what is field-based method for economics. Research on commons is one such area where facts from field have contributed to modification of economic theory and models. This provides an excellent scope for studying the field-based methods of economists. The present article is my understanding of the collective action theories in commons, which grew as a field-based method. In this paper I describe the development of game modeling of collective action in commons, suggesting why some matters were accepted, some rejected, and some others are still awaited. The first section is about the emergence of CPR game theories of commons as a field-based method. The second section lists a few questions raised in the field indicating the need for modifying game model in specific direction. The third and final section introduces certain recent efforts of theorizing in these directions."

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empiricism, common pool resources--theory, collective action--models, economics--methodology, game theory--models, research--methodology

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