Bribery, Regulators, and Firms: Corruption in the S & L Industry, 1982-1989

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dc.contributor.authorGardner, Roy
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werner
dc.coverage.countryUnited Statesen_US
dc.coverage.regionNorth Americaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-04T14:55:29Z
dc.date.available2010-01-04T14:55:29Z
dc.date.issued1992en_US
dc.description.abstract"A bribe is anything, usually money, offered to someone to do something illegal. This paper builds a simple 2-player, 2-sided incomplete information game with bribery as one of its strategic possibilities. The paper then solves the game using all dominant strategies available at equilibrium. There is a nondegenerate subset of the parameter space where all firms in financial difficulty offer bribes to their regulators, and all dishonest regulators accept these bribes. The model is applied to developments in the Savings & Loan industry of the United States, 1982-89."en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdatesSeptember 10, 1992en_US
dc.identifier.citationconferenceConference on Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciencesen_US
dc.identifier.citationconflocFrankfurt, Germanyen_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10535/5312
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.subjectWorkshopen_US
dc.subjectgame theoryen_US
dc.subjectfirm--theoryen_US
dc.subjectregulationen_US
dc.subjectcorruptionen_US
dc.subject.sectorSocial Organizationen_US
dc.subject.sectorTheoryen_US
dc.titleBribery, Regulators, and Firms: Corruption in the S & L Industry, 1982-1989en_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.type.methodologyTheoryen_US
dc.type.publishedunpublisheden_US

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