Experimental Contributions to Collective Action Theory
dc.contributor.author | Coleman, Eric A. | |
dc.contributor.author | Ostrom, Elinor | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-11-02T20:41:36Z | |
dc.date.available | 2011-11-02T20:41:36Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | "Collective action problems are difficult problems that pervade all forms of social organization, from within the family, to the organization of production activities within a firm, and to the provision of public goods (PG) and the management of common-pool resources (CPRs) at local, regional, national, and global scales. Collective action problems occur when a group of individuals could achieve a common benefit if most contribute needed resources. Those who would benefit the most, however, are individuals who do not contribute to the provision of the joint benefit and free ride on the efforts of others. If all free ride, however, no benefits are provided." | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10535/7658 | |
dc.language | English | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | W09-7 | en_US |
dc.subject | collective action | en_US |
dc.subject | political science | en_US |
dc.subject.sector | Social Organization | en_US |
dc.title | Experimental Contributions to Collective Action Theory | en_US |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
dc.type.methodology | Case Study | en_US |
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