Water Users Association in Madagascar: Why Does it Fail?

Abstract

"In European countries, markets are well developed and governments relatively efficient to correct their failures. The set of social dilemmas communities face is thus relatively limited. In developing economies the opposite is true: missing markets and poorly performing governments leave communities with a much wider range of social dilemmas.

"This paper discusses implementation of new irrigation systems management in Madagascar (smallholder rice economy). We particularly focus on the role of farmers in irrigation management and development of farmers' organisation. Madagascar's government (as many others governments around the world) has adopted a program to devolve responsibility for irrigation management to Water Users Associations (WUA). This reform was mainly driven by government fiscal shortages and inability to raise sufficient revenues from collection of water charges. Decentralization and devolution of water resources management should increase water user participation in decision-making and investment, and improve management incentives, accountability, agricultural and economic productivity and cost recovery. This development tool is a participatory, bottom-up concept which has received particular attention in recent decades. The major benefit of such a program should be a more equitable water distribution among members regardless of their location, type or size of farm. Moreover, water conflicts could be dealt quickly at local level, and among one's peers if there is a Water Users Association. Other benefits include more water reliability, well-maintained canals, less water theft, and empowerment through participation.

"The paper proposes an explanation of opportunistic behaviour in WUA that jeopardizes the sustainability and development of its members' welfare (watering crops without paying the water price for example). We determine the actor groups characteristics and effective institutional settings at the local level, such as limited sanctioning and enforcement mechanisms and almost no monitoring mechanisms, that provide the conditions for such a behaviour dominates. The study is based on the first results from an empirical field study in Madagascar. The discussion is based on empirical material from Ampitatafika village in the Central Highlands. Effective rules-in-use in local communities are presented. We try to explore the community's capacity to solve such a collective action problem which is critical the sustainability and development of its members' welfare. This article wonders if there are additional influencing variables that have an impact on the institutional change and constrain the emergence of collective action solutions."