The Theory of Communicative Action and the Problem of the Commons

Abstract

"This paper is the first general sharing from a work in progress at the Michigan State Sociology Department on enhancing the theoretical perspective of human ecology by relating it to elements of critical social theory. As such, it is being presented in a tentative spirit with hopes that it will prove provocative and call forth the suggestions of the readers.

"The commons problem in general is understood as any situation in which it is possible for actors to free ride i.e. externalize their costs onto the group. Such situations arise in many contexts and very often need to be resolved because the free riding threatens the benefits of all the actors. An effective commons problem resolution can be called a commons agreement and it requires three things: institutions which ground the benefits and costs of the actors involved (Christy 1982, Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 1975, Runge 1981, 1984); regulations which govern the actors behaviors (Baden 1977, Hardin 1968, Ostrom 1986); and norms and recognitions of legitimacy which allow the institutions and regulations to function (Bromley and Cernea 1989, Bullock and Baden 1977, Cordell 1973, Oakerson 1986) and to remain flexible, since the parameters of commons problems often shift and require renegotiation (Magrath 1989, McCay 1981, Ostrom 1977). All three of these things are required to some degree if the commons agreement is to work."