Keeping an Eye on Your Neighbors: Agents Monitoring and Sanctioning One Another in a Common-Pool Resource Environment

dc.contributor.authorCasari, Marcoen_US
dc.contributor.authorPlott, Charles R.en_US
dc.coverage.regionEuropeen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-31T14:30:11Z
dc.date.available2009-07-31T14:30:11Z
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.date.submitted2001-10-29en_US
dc.date.submitted2001-10-29en_US
dc.description.abstract"The role of a specific institution in avoiding a 'tragedy of the commons' situation in a common pool-resource environment is studied experimentally. The resource users privately decide their own exploitation level and then, once the group outcome is revealed, can choose to select other individuals for inspection. At a cost the inspector can view the decision of any individual. If the inspected individual has exploited the resource excessively, relative to a publicly known amount, a fine is imposed and paid to the inspector. The rules were modeled after a historical case of self-governed rural communities in Northern Italy. "The introduction of the sanctioning institution greatly improves the efficiency of the group outcome from the initial level of severe 'tragedy.' The classical model with homogeneous, self-interested agents cannot explain these results. We present a model with heterogeneous, other-regarding agents that is compatible with both the resource use and the inspection decision patterns. In particular, differences in altruism/spite can explain the wide diversity of individual behavior and the willingness of spiteful agents to request unprofitable inspections help explaining the high inspection rate."en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdatesMay 31-June 4en_US
dc.identifier.citationconferenceConstituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millennium, the Eighth Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Propertyen_US
dc.identifier.citationconflocBloomington, Indiana, USAen_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10535/470
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.subjectIASCen_US
dc.subjectcommon pool resources--researchen_US
dc.subjectinstitutional analysisen_US
dc.subjecttragedy of the commons--modelsen_US
dc.subjectgame theoryen_US
dc.subjectaltruism--modelsen_US
dc.subjectmonitoring and sanctioning--modelsen_US
dc.subjectexperimental economicsen_US
dc.subject.sectorTheoryen_US
dc.submitter.emailhess@indiana.eduen_US
dc.titleKeeping an Eye on Your Neighbors: Agents Monitoring and Sanctioning One Another in a Common-Pool Resource Environmenten_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.type.publishedunpublisheden_US

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