Institutional Dysfunctionality: A Case Study in Participatory Management of Forest in Buxa Tiger Reserve in North Bengal, India

Abstract

"Reserve and its fringe area in North Bengal. India, various forms of institutional dysfunctionality have been discussed in the paper in a descriptive manner. Dysfunctionality develops and its form changes over time. As it develops in a participatory institution it blocks the participatory mechanism, the devolution of decision-making power and smooth flow of information between the participatory agents. This in turn creates a stalemate on conservation programme. In analytical section of the paper this problem has been handled in terms of distributed game. There are different sets of players with different games at three different locations i.e. three different tiers of forest management institutions: (1) Forest Department, (2) FPC/ EDC. i.e., forest management committee, and, SHG, i.e., Self Help Group. The player's strategy is jointly determined by set of his location specific action along with set of message transmission. If institutional dysfunctionality prevails, this blocks message transmission, generating binding restrictions on action of the players that affects cooperative equilibrium. All these matters have some notable policy implication in practical world."