Social Norms and Economic Theory

dc.contributor.authorElster, Jonen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-31T14:59:06Z
dc.date.available2009-07-31T14:59:06Z
dc.date.issued1989en_US
dc.date.submitted2008-03-17en_US
dc.date.submitted2008-03-17en_US
dc.description.abstract"Social norms must be distinguished from a number of other, related phenomena. First, social norms differ from moral norms. Some moral norms, like those derived from utilitarian ethics, are consequentialist. Secondly, social norms differ from legal norms. Legal norms are enforced by specialists who do so out of self-interest: they will lose their job if they don't. By contrast, social norms are enforced by members of the general community, and not always out of self-interest (see below). Thirdly, social norms are more than the convention equilibria described in Robert Sugden's accompanying article. As Sugden explains, the evolution of a convention equilibrium is guided by whether the conventions lead to a substantively better outcome. I argue below, however, that many social norms do not benefit anyone. Fourthly, social norms differ from private norms, the self-imposed rules that people construct to overcome weakness of will (Ainslie 1982, 1984, 1986). Private norms, like social norms, are non-outcome-oriented and sustained by feelings of anxiety and guilt. They are not, however, sustained by the approval and disapproval of others since they are not, or not necessarily, shared with others. Finally, norm-guided behavior must be distinguished from habits and compulsive neuroses. Unlike social norms, habits are private. Unlike private norms, their violation does not generate self-blame or guilt. Unlike neuroses and private norms, habits are not compulsive. Unlike social norms, compulsive neuroses are highly idiosyncratic. Yet what in one culture looks like a compulsive neurosis may, in another society, be an established social norm (Fenichel 1945, p. 586). Compulsive revenge behavior could be an example (Djilas, 1958)."en_US
dc.identifier.citationjournalJournal of Economic Perspectivesen_US
dc.identifier.citationmonthJanuaryen_US
dc.identifier.citationnumber4en_US
dc.identifier.citationvolume3en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10535/3264
dc.subjectsocial organization--theoryen_US
dc.subjectnorms--theoryen_US
dc.subjecteconomic theoryen_US
dc.subject.sectorSocial Organizationen_US
dc.subject.sectorTheoryen_US
dc.submitter.emailrshivakoti@yahoo.comen_US
dc.titleSocial Norms and Economic Theoryen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.type.publishedpublisheden_US

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