Self-Governance in the Maine Lobster Fishery

Abstract

"The Maine lobster fishery has long been described as a classic case of overfishing - both biologically and economically. To the discomfort of standard management theory the fishery continues to produce high sustained yields; in terms of biological performance it may be one of the best managed fisheries in the world. This result occurs without resort to limited entry or individual transferable quotas (ITQ's). This paper argues there are strong biological, social and economic reasons to be skeptical that limited entry will ever solve the fisheries conservation problem. It suggests that the reasons for the lobster fishery's continued success can be found in the institutions of virtual user self-governance that have evolved over the years. Self-governance forces a consensus with regard to the kinds of rules used in the fishery, assures wide-spread perception of their fairness and efficacy and leads to a situation where social sanctions are widely used for their enforcement. Self governance in this fishery has led to mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon and mutually enforced."