Thinking Globally and Getting Others to Act Locally: Polycentricity and the Conservation of Biodiversity

Abstract

"Protecting biodiversity involves two social dilemmas that are closely linked. A local dilemma where the local users of forests face where individual extraction of a resource might not produce an outcome for the group that is socially desirable because of the risks involved in CPR dilemmas. Self-governance and externally imposed institutions can be implemented to overcome this first dilemma. A second dilemma exists when the group extraction of resources from the forest affect the well-being of outsiders, namely, the stock and variety of biodiversity in the forest for which there is a demand in terms of existence and option values. State and non-state actors have emerged from international to local levels to reduce these impacts by implementing programs and introducing economic incentives to induce in the local users a change in their rate of extraction so that spillovers to outsiders are reduced. However these actors face a typical Principal-Agent problem when implementing their programs. The result is a complex system of actors and a set of vertical, horizontal and diagonal relations that create a polycentric system. This paper uses a simple economic model to describe and combine the two dilemmas, and studies the problem within the context of Colombia where there is a convergence of high biodiversity and high dependence by rural groups on resources, difficult state governance, and a shift towards decentralized systems of environmental policy. The paper may contribute to expanding the implications and potentials of thinking of polycentric systems when studying these types of more complex problems."