Cost Sharing for Public Goods: Exploring Alternative Institutions for Coordination under Heterogeneity

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dc.contributor.authorLoehman, Edna T.
dc.contributor.authorKiser, Richard
dc.contributor.authorRassenti, Stephen J.
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-04T19:34:19Z
dc.date.available2010-06-04T19:34:19Z
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.description.abstract"Four institutions for group decision about cost-sharing for a public good are compared here experimentally. Three of the institutions are based on price-taking behavior. The fourth mechanism is similar to a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism in its use of bids. Three of the four use some form of bid messages. Design of each institution is based on an underlying coordination algorithm. The common experimental game framework includes unanimity voting to select the group outcome and provide an incentive against free-riding. The experimental environment exhibits heterogeneity in endowments and rewards. Testing confirmed that the nature of institutional rules affect individual behavior and group decision."en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdatesMarch 21-24en_US
dc.identifier.citationconferencePublic Choice Society Meetingsen_US
dc.identifier.citationconflocSan Diego, CAen_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10535/5821
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.subjectgame theoryen_US
dc.subjectinstitutionsen_US
dc.subjectheterogeneityen_US
dc.subjectrulesen_US
dc.subjectdecision making--theoryen_US
dc.subjectpublic goods and bads--theoryen_US
dc.subjectbehavior--theoryen_US
dc.subject.sectorTheoryen_US
dc.titleCost Sharing for Public Goods: Exploring Alternative Institutions for Coordination under Heterogeneityen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.type.methodologyTheoryen_US
dc.type.publishedunpublisheden_US

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