Optimalnye institutsionalnye strategii i identichnost v usloviyah neopredelennosti sotsialnyh dilemma (na primere binarnyh igr) [The Optimal Institutional Strategies and Identity in Uncertainty of Social Dilemmas: Binary Games]

Abstract

In this article, optimal institutional strategies of social agents in game uncertainty, and in models of matching and marriage are analyzed. The author believes that game theory analyzes the “inner” rationality of individual interactions. Game theory aggregates a lot of social interactions to some choices, and analyzes uncertainty of behavioral variants as an understandable and stable pattern of regular interactions. The author concludes that institutional analysis of game situations is necessary for discrening key social and cognitive challenges that social agents face in everyday life. Identity construction helps social agents find solutions in social dilemmas. Therefore the analysis of game behavior should include studies of identity space.