International Cooperation and the International Commons

dc.contributor.authorBarrett, Scotten_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-31T15:01:40Z
dc.date.available2009-07-31T15:01:40Z
dc.date.issued1999en_US
dc.date.submitted2009-03-05en_US
dc.date.submitted2009-03-05en_US
dc.description.abstract"Efforts to sustain international cooperation invariably culminate in the signing of an international treaty, the success of which depends on the acumen of the individuals that negotiate it and the nature of the problem being addressed. But, while diplomats can make a difference, even the cleverest of diplomats cannot be relied upon to sustain first-best outcomes in all cases. Usually cooperation will be partial and there will be some loss in efficiency. International co-operation in these situations is analogous to domestic politics. Democracy may be the best system of government imaginable, but Arrow has taught us that we cannot rely on majority voting to sustain first-best outcomes every time."en_US
dc.identifier.citationjournalDuke Environmental Law & Policy Forumen_US
dc.identifier.citationmonthJanuaryen_US
dc.identifier.citationnumber1en_US
dc.identifier.citationvolume10en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10535/3484
dc.subjectproperty rights--internationalen_US
dc.subjectenvironmental protection--internationalen_US
dc.subjectglobal commonsen_US
dc.subjectprivatizationen_US
dc.subjectregulationen_US
dc.subjectpollutionen_US
dc.subjecttradeen_US
dc.subjectmarketsen_US
dc.subject.sectorGlobal Commonsen_US
dc.titleInternational Cooperation and the International Commonsen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.type.publishedpublisheden_US

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