Restoring the Great Lakes: Institutional Analysis and Design

Abstract

"I will briefly outline the scope of the multiple uses of the Great Lakes as a whole and describe the most recent attempts to restore the water quality of the most degraded bays, harbours and river mouths on these Lakes. The range of collective choice and operational rules through which these recent attempts known as RAP's (Remedial Action Plans) work will be sketched. The third section will review our knowledge about common properties, their technical characteristics and dynamics. The fourth section will describe property rights in general and then develop the conditions for adaptation in these rules. An extended example of water rights will be used. Section five develops the concept of multiple stakeholders and their potential property rights. Section six deals with collective choice rules and presents a framework for the institutional analysis of RAP's and their implementation. Concepts and data used to examine RAP's are described. Section seven presents the major findings of the research. The dominant incentives are described as are key exceptions. These reflect the scope of constitutional discretion accorded to the governmental stakeholders granted authority to design the institutional arrangements for plans and their implementation. The major rules at the collective choice level that form the design arrangements are described and evaluated in terms of balancing the interests of the multiple stakeholders. Section eight is a conclusion. It reemphasizes the importance of careful institutional design in the real world, something that is not exemplified on the Great Lakes and which suggests limits to their restoration."