Factor Rents, Sole Ownership, and the Optimum Level of Fisheries Exploitation

dc.contributor.authorCopes, Parzivalen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-31T14:58:47Z
dc.date.available2009-07-31T14:58:47Z
dc.date.issued1972en_US
dc.date.submitted2008-12-03en_US
dc.date.submitted2008-12-03en_US
dc.description.abstract"In the literature of fisheries economics there is a noticeable preoccupation with the phenomenon of resource rent dissipation. The common property nature of most fishery resources-with the attendant free entry of labour and capital-gives rise to 'problems' of 'overfishing'. If at any given level of fishing effort the resource should yield a rent to the marginal operator, additional factor inputs of labour and capital will be attracted that will depress the catch per unit of effort and lower returns to all operators. This process will continue until the revenue per unit of fishing effort is reduced to the level of its marginal opportunity cost. Thus the rent attributable to the resource, that formerly accounted for the excess of revenue over marginal opportunity cost, is eliminated."en_US
dc.identifier.citationjournalManchester School of Economics and Social Studiesen_US
dc.identifier.citationmonthJuneen_US
dc.identifier.citationnumber2en_US
dc.identifier.citationvolume40en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10535/3234
dc.subjectfisheriesen_US
dc.subjectexploitationen_US
dc.subject.sectorFisheriesen_US
dc.titleFactor Rents, Sole Ownership, and the Optimum Level of Fisheries Exploitationen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.type.publishedpublisheden_US

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