Elections with Limited Information: A Multi-Dimensional Model

dc.contributor.authorMcKelvey, Richard D.
dc.contributor.authorOrdeshook, Peter C.
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-21T19:18:55Z
dc.date.available2010-06-21T19:18:55Z
dc.date.issued1984en_US
dc.description.abstract"We develop a game theoretic model of 2 candidate competition over a multidimensional policy space, where the participants have incomplete information about the preferences and strategy choices of other participants . The players consist of the voters and the candidates. Voters are partitioned into two classes, depending on the information they observe. Informed voters observe candidate strategy choices while uninformed voters do not. All players (voters and candidates alike ) observe contemporaneous poll data broken down by various subgroups of the population. The main results of the paper give condition s on the number and distribution of the informed and uninformed voters which are sufficient to guarantee that any equilibrium (or voter equilibrium ) extracts all information ."en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10535/5870
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseriesCalifornia Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CAen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSocial Science Working Papers, no. 529en_US
dc.subjectcompetitionen_US
dc.subjectmajority ruleen_US
dc.subjectstabilityen_US
dc.subjectelections--modelsen_US
dc.subjectvoting--modelsen_US
dc.subject.sectorSocial Organizationen_US
dc.subject.sectorTheoryen_US
dc.titleElections with Limited Information: A Multi-Dimensional Modelen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.type.methodologyModelingen_US
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Elections with limited information a multidimensional model.pdf
Size:
449.8 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Collections