Rules, Rule Making and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and Resource Use

Abstract

"This chapter examines institutions that guide fodder and fuelwood use in community forests in Almora district. The analysis focuses the effects of institutional rules on common resource use - particularly rules related to enforcement of use rules. Six instances of resource use provide the empirical grist for the analysis. Successful institutional solutions to resource management problems, I hypothesize, must create and enforce rules on at least four operational levels: resource utilization, monitoring, sanctioning, and arbitration. The creation and enforcement of rules at each of these levels constitutes a problem of collective action which if solved successfully creates institutional arrangements that support the sustainable use of resources. If the collective action problem remains unsolved at any one of these levels, it can (and possibly, will) lead to the unravelling of the entire institutional arrangement. For example, failure to sanction rule violators, or mistakenly sanction those who never violated rules, encourages further rule violations or promotes resentment among users against existing institutions. Or, incorrect prescription of use rules can lead either to excessive withdrawal of benefits from the resource system or to withdrawal of very limited benefits - the latter enticing users to extract greater benefits in violation of prescribed rules. The analysis of different rule arrangements in the studied villages shows that it is invariably the failure to create or enforce rules at some operational level that leads to institutional failure. Indeed, constraints on the capacity of village institutions to enforce rules were most often the cause behind unsuccessful institutions and degraded panchayat forests."