Sharing Power - Insights from Archetypal Games

Abstract

"Vincent and Elinor Ostrom both wrestled with the problems posed by institutions that give rulers power over others, the authority to coerce, and the dangers of the 'Faustian bargain' underlying asymmetric power in governance. This paper applies simple game theory models of archetypal (social/strategic/action) situations of interdependence to examine diversity in power and in the institutions that may empower and constrain rulers and other social actors, including reciprocal power over, coordinated power with, capabilities for freedom, benevolent authority, unilateral taking, zero-sum contestation, and threats of resistance. The diversity of power in archetypal games offers insights for crafting and caring for institutions that share power. Highlights • Making ties simplifies payoff matrices to derive archetypal games. Archetypal games show diversity in models of how power may be distributed, including joint power-with in coordination; independent power-to; reciprocal (exchange) power-over; unilateral power-over to help, benefit, or deprive; and contested-power in cyclic conflict. • Archetypal game models offer examples for thinking about the options and limitations for sharing power, including enhancing co-creation in power-with, strengthening capabilities for autonomous power-to, and restraining power-over, such as through norms, morality, care, wisdom, and distributed checks-and-balances. • Breaking ties in archetypal games generates lineages of games with more complexity and more collective action problems for achieving equity, efficiency, and stability. Coordination of power-with confronts rivalry and distrust, mutual power-over becomes vulnerable to temptation and distrust, and the disadvantages of asymmetric power-to may lead to negotiation and transformation."