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Conference Paper Consolidation of Local Democracy In River Preservation And Fisheries Management on The Lower Sao Francisco River, Northeast Brazil(2006) Andrade, Renata Marson Teixeira de"This paper focuses on the effects of institutional choices and recognition on decentralization of river preservation and fisheries management on the Lower Sao Francisco River, Northeast Brazil, especially since the 1990s. By emphasizing issues of inequities and marginalization that stem from identity politics and institutional choices, the objective is to understand how the institutionalization of participatory watershed and fisheries/aquaculture management programs increase or decrease the possibility of democratic action and democratic control at the local level. Grounded in a detailed ethnographic study in two municipalities, this paper explores how the decentralization of the Federal Government's Revitalization Plan in the Sao Francisco River basin changes access to democratic control over fishing resources. It finds that the decentralization of the Revitalization Plan in some cases expands and in others undercuts the possibility of democratic action, especially for historically marginalized local communities whose livelihoods have traditionally depended on the river habitat, water quality and flow regime. This paper also examines the extent to which elected municipal versus traditional fishing authorities represent the interests and needs of fishing communities with regard to fisheries management. It first traces the historical context of the relationship between fishing communities and state in the region, and then presents detailed findings drawn from two municipalities alongside the Sao Francisco River. It finds that the process of institutionalizing participatory watershed and fisheries management in Brazil has helped in some circumstances to undermine and in others to strengthen both elected municipal and fishing communities along the lower Sao Francisco River."Conference Paper Bioeconomic Approach to Investment and Regulatory Policy Formulation for Cage Culture of Tilapia in Sampaloc Lake, Philippines(1993) Tan, Reynaldo L.; Higuchi, Teizo; Honma, Tetsushi"The main concern of this study is two-fold: to improve the efficiency and productivity of cage culture operation of Tilapia in Sampaloc Lake and to provide practical bases for reassessing the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) Fishery Zoning Plan. Primary data consisted of surveys of fishcage farmers operation in 1986 and 1990. Results of regression analysis showed that fish size at harvest, stocking density and feeding rate affect yield significantly. Moreover, due to the shift to more intensive feeding, the issue of overcrowding can be ignored and locational advantage plays a minor role. However, it was empirically confirmed that feeds were being applied in excess relative to the prevailing stocking density. At the prevailing technology, the optimal stocking density was found to be 19 times higher than the actual average of about 20 fingerlings/ sq. m. This optimum stocking density was compared to the stocking densities in other countries and it turned out to be relatively moderate. Technical investigation of the cage size-stocking density relationship showed that the carrying capacity of a cage varies primarily with its size. A stochastic frontier total cost function employing translog functional form was used in measuring the levels of inefficiency of the individual cage farmers and the average inefficiency level was found to be 14%. Cage size, stocking density and culture length tend to affect inefficiency the most and the prevailing average yield level, only about 15% of the existing average cage size is needed to produce it. Thus, the 15-ha fishcage belt limit being imposed by LLDA can be met without necessarily dislocating any of the fishcage farmers in the lake."Conference Paper Institutional Sustainability for Water Resource Management: A Case Study of Dong People's Water Resource Management in Zengchong Village, Congjiang County, Guizhou Province, P.R. China(2003) Zhinan, Li"In Zengchong village, there was a traditional Kuan institution for water resource management in the past, which was eventually destroyed, but now local people have constructed the Cun Gui Min Yue for water resource management, which was derived from traditional Kuan. Through analyze this dynamic process, this paper found that local tradition can be manipulated even under the modernized China today. And also this paper demonstrates how the development of local water institution articulated with outsider context."Conference Paper Local Institutions in Common Property Resources: A Study of Community-based Watershed Management in Northern Thailand(1995) Wittayapak, Chusak"The watersheds in Thailand are dejtire governed by the state-property regime. Watershed management has been left entirely to government administration, mainly through the Royal Forestry Department (RED). This is because until recently these areas were extensively forested. However, under this governance the forest area has declined dramatically, from 53 percent of the country area in 1961, to 29 percent in 1986. Forests and watershed resources have de facto become an open-access resource which are susceptible to unlimited exploitation. "Initiatives to privatize forest resources have so far failed to stop deforestation. Moreover, in many cases they may even have accelerated forest depletion. Furthermore, privatization often tends to concentrate wealth in the hands of the few, at the expense of equity. In fact, private reforestation by means of a large-scale commercial forestry does not alleviate poverty since it fails to distribute benefits to the local people. Nor does it recognize traditional rights or any interest or capability in local communities to manage the forest resource around them."Conference Paper Impacts of Management Turnover in Two Irrigation Districts in Colombia(1996) Vermillion, Douglas L.; Garces-Restrepo, Carlos"This paper assesses the impacts of the transfer of management for two irrigation districts in Colombia from a government agency to farmer water users associations. Changes in governance and management roles, responsibility and rights are defined and related to incentives of the water users to achieve certain performance objectives. Since the transfer in 1976, the financial viability of the districts has improved primarily through increased water charges, sideline revenues and reductions in staff. Farmer-elected boards revised operational procedures and cropping patterns, which supported an enlargement of service area with the same water. A complete inventory of canals and structures documented that the schemes have been reasonably well maintained by the districts. Gross value of agricultural output has risen well ahead of inflation. The total cost of irrigation has declined relative to both cost of production and gross value of output. The paper also presents survey data on perspectives of farmers, irrigation staff and agency officials."Conference Paper Conceptualizing Large Scale Common Pool Resources through the SES Framework: Resource and Institutional Dynamics in the Rhine Watershed(2013) Villamayor-Tomas, Sergio; Fleischman, Forrest; Perez Ibarra, Irene; Thiel, Andreas; van Laerhoven, Frank"In this paper we develop a case study of water governance in the Rhine River to examine the relevance of Common Pool Resource (CPR) theory for two contexts that have not been extensively tested before: large scale trans-boundary water management, and pollution problems."Conference Paper Shade or Energy: Resource Views At the Kunene River (Angola/Namibia)(2000) Hjort-af-Ornäs, Anders"This case study draws on a politically sensitive situation in Southern Angola and Northern Namibia where national and local interests conflict over the use of river water in a very narrow riparian stretch of the Cunene river, forming what can be described as a line oasis. Access to this riparian area is key to the current livestock production capacity. Added to this is an intense focus by international NGOs on the issue of potential hydropower production. "The riparian zone has different meanings in terms of a common resource: It forms a pivotal component in a local pastoral production system, providing livestock reproduction resources (fodder, water and not least shade). It represents an emergency food area for both humans and animals during critical weeks of the seasonal cycle. It holds the potential to be a national asset for improved self-reliance and political independence from the big neighbour, South Africa. It is located within the SADC region political domain, though still with insufficient legally binding agreements. Finally, it is an international issue because of the plans for hydropower production. "The inhabitants of this riparian zone subsist primarily on livestock rearing. While the cultural tradition of relying on riparian commons has deep historic roots, the current social forms are relatively new. Today's so-called traditional pastoral Himba society is, to a great extent, shaped by colonial events (Portuguese, German and South African dominance). The pastoral production system relies on the riparian zone in a seemingly sustainable fashion, but eco-tourism and unemployment seem to begin to degrade both physical and social landscapes. "With the possible introduction of a hydropower project in this setting, yet another large-scale impact seems likely. The paper focuses on social consequences and how common resources are perceived and maintained. The different views of the primary users on the riparian commons are accounted for, and are contrasted with a number of interpretations of community interests. In the final analysis, the ethical issue boils down to how the riparian interests of a small population, in this case only partly seasonal, can be balanced with the democratic rights of a majority population."Conference Paper Governance of Groundwater Ecosystem Service Trade-Offs in Gauteng, South Africa: An Institutional Analysis(2013) Beckh, Charlotte"The governance of groundwater ecosystem services and trade-offs is still poorly understood. The highly urbanized South African province Gauteng currently faces problems of groundwater over-abstraction and pollution. Population growth, economic development and climate change impacts contribute to an increasing risk of crisis. Groundwater trade-offs between diverse user sectors with conflicting resources interests are apparent. The South African National Water Act makes sophisticated provisions for ecosystem services and trade-offs that are not always effective in practice. The paper thus asks the question: How are groundwater ecosystem service trade-offs governed in practice in Gauteng? The paper offers answers to this question through a review of relevant literature and the qualitative analysis of 41 interviews conducted with experts from the government, science, and society. The results confirm that formal institutions are frequently ineffective, and applied and enforced in a biased manner, prioritizing socio-economic development over environmental sustainability. The analysis of informal institutions and their interplay with formal ones unveils deep-seated reasons for the ineffectiveness of current groundwater governance. Four informal institutions in terms of socially shared expectations have been identified that compete with formal institutions. In contrast, networks from the informal realm enhance the effectiveness of formal institutions and governance. While self-regulation and networking need to be fostered, governance through a hierarchical command-and-control approach is preferred and market mechanisms are generally met with suspicion by civil society. The paper argues that a holistic approach and political will is needed for translating existing formal institutions into social practice while unlocking the potential of civil society. Mainstreaming the concept of ecosystem services and related trade-offs into the groundwater governance discourse and practice, as well as the consideration of informal institutions, can lead to improved decision-making and more effective and sustainable groundwater governance."Conference Paper Managing the Ecosystem Services Linked to Water Resources Commons in South East Queensland, Australia(2006) Sarker, Ashutosh; Ross, Helen"This paper analyses how non-market-based instruments and market-based instruments could together address soil erosion and nutrients problems that prevail in the water resources commons in South East Queensland, Australia. Land owners' individual actions, such as historical land clearing in their private land and use of inorganic fertilizers, have contributed to soil erosion and nutrients problems respectively in the Brisbane River and Moreton Bay downstream. These problems have common property implications since private actions of land owners in their land management and water usage affect the common property access of others to water quality for consumption and recreational uses. Both humans and other species depend on the water quality of the Brisbane River and of Moreton Bay, which is recognised under the Ramsar Convention for its biodiversity values. "A range of proposals have been made to encourage improved land management practices in the interests of water quality. The non-market- based instruments include education, moral persuasion, institutions-based design principles learned through international experience, and government command and control regulation for environment management. MBIs include price-based instruments and quantity-based instruments, which have in turn sub-classifications. "Government regulation through the command and control mechanism has shown poor performance, and neither social nor formal rules for managing environment are well-crafted. The concepts of market-based instruments are relatively new and have shown some promising results in managing the environment, but these instruments are not substitutes for non- market based instruments. We argue that non-market and market-based instruments could be complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Choosing the right combination is a challenge; yet could solve the problems of ecosystem commons in South East Queensland. Our paper attempts to explore suitable combinations of market and non-market based instruments in the context of the environmental management situation in South East Queensland. The design principles that Ostrom and their colleagues at the Indiana University have developed principally concern the commons of customary societies. Some of these design principles such as 'Congruence between Appropriation and Provision Rules,' and 'Monitoring Collective-Choice Arrangements' are applicable in Australian commons, which are non-customary, while the command and control mechanism is expected to remain necessary to some extent. In addition, market-based instruments would be a commendable complement to non-market-based instruments. Some of the price-based instruments are incentive payments and tendering, while quantity-based instruments include environmental offsets."Conference Paper Owners Escape Unharmed: Activation of Institutional Rules in Rivalries between Heterogeneous Water Users(2004) Aubin, David"The provision of different goods and services from the same natural common-pool resource increases scarcity and threatens renewability. The behaviour of resource users is regulated by various institutional rules, mainly property rights and public policies. These rules are activated in order to defend their own use against others. How do heterogeneous water users solve their rivalries? Our theoretical framework suggests that a resolution of rivalries comesout of a process of activation and confrontation of rules between competing users. We postulate that an owner activates property rights and a non-owner public policies that point him out as a final beneficiary. We retain here two ideal-typical user confrontations: property rights against property rights and property rights against public policies. We advocate that success in the resolution of the rivalry is subject to a specific kind of local arrangement in each case. If two owners confront, then the rivalry is solved through a bilateral agreement, and if an owner confronts with a final beneficiary, then the State compensates the owner for his loss. We test these two hypotheses on four empirical cases in Belgium and Switzerland. What emerges from the analysis is that an owner never loses in a resolution of a rivalry, or not much at all."