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Conference Paper War and the Commons: Assessing the Changing Politics of Violence, Access and Entitlements in Sri Lanka(2004) Korf, Benedikt; Fünfgeld, Hartmut"This paper investigates the impacts of political violence on access to local commons and looks at local contestsover resource entitlements under the condition of warfare and post-war transition in Sri Lanka. We map out two essential trajectories of refused and contested access to commons in the highly volatile institutional setting ofwar and post-war situations: On the one hand, the political geography of war and fighting creates 'no-go zones'. These often include local commons, such as jungle, lagoon and marine resources that become places ofincreased military contest. On the other hand, threats, intimidation and violence to admit or refuse access toresources for the 'ethnic other' is utilized as an essential instrument in the local contestations over ethnic identity, historical entitlements and discourses of spatial claims. In this volatile setup, social and politicalcapital play crucial, though highly ambiguous roles for accessing the commons, and they are subject to continuous value change, depending on the political developments of the conflict. We illustrate this dynamism using two case studies of local common-pool and open-access resource systems in the war-affected east of Sri Lanka. In the first case study, we describe local contests over water distribution in a large-scale irrigation scheme located in a multi-ethnic area. In this case, farmers utilize their hydraulic positions within the irrigationset-up for both, gaining material advantages (diverting more water for irrigation) and using water as a means of power against the 'ethnic other'. Spatial access to water and land may be actively denied by physicalviolence or discouraged by intimidation. In doing so, civilians are embedded in a complex clientele network with local political and military power holders. The second case study highlights issues of changing access rights and resource use patterns in a large lagoon ecosystem. Since the lagoon was part of a militarily contested terrain during times of war, this produced severe access restrictions and security problems for local customary resource users. When overt violence came to a halt with the signing of a ceasefire and access was open again, alarge number of customary and new users started exploiting lagoon resources, which led to increasing interandintra-community tension and resource overexploitation. Both case studies illustrate the volatile, polarised and hybrid nature of local institutions which produce a governance failure. These failed institutions undermine local peace building, because they feed back into existing political grievances."Conference Paper Tale of Two Islands: An Evolution of Coastal Resources Management in the Philippines(2004) Ferrer, Elmer M."This paper is an attempt to trace the evolution of coastal resources management, and community-based coastal resources management (CBCRM) in particular, in the Philippines. It begins with reviewing written accounts of two marine reserves considered to be pioneering experiments in coastal resources management. The paper then proceeds to distinguish key features between integrated coastal management (ICM) and CBCRM as two distinct tracks/approaches to coastal resources management (CRM). The paper ends with key challenges that we face in pursuing CBCRM."Conference Paper 'Marketing' Environmental Services: Lessons Learned in German Development Cooperation(2004) Hartmann, Jörg; Petersen, Lorenz"Along with disenchantment over lacking effectiveness and efficiency of traditional policy instruments in natural resources management comes growing interest in alternative approaches. One of these is Payments for Environmental Services (PES): Economic incentives instead of command and control. The concept is intuitively appealing: by offering payments to private land owners as compensation for providing positive externalities like clean water, the public can change the financial rationale behind land use decisions that would otherwise be based only on private costs and benefits. "The logic behind payments for environmental services is not new. For decades farm subsidies have been justified by real or perceived environmental benefits from agriculture. Development agencies have provided subsidies to farmers for afforestation or similar projects. What is new is the explicit use of the concept of payments for environmental services (PES) in developing countries, particularly in Latin America. The increasing recognition of the environmental functions of forests, and the services their owners provide to the public at the local, national and global level, has led to great expectations. At the same time scarce resources have increased pressure to fine-tune PES for improved efficiency and effectiveness. "In German Development Co-operation, funded by the Federal Ministry for Economic Development and Cooperation (BMZ) and implemented by both the German Development Bank KfW and GTZ, the German Agency for Technical Co-operation, a number of such programs have been operational in Latin America since the mid-1990s. In this paper, we will be looking at experiences with this programme portfolio in the forest and water sectors and will be discussing a set of issues that seem to be determining success and/or failure in this kind of programme. "Based on our analysis creating win-win situations is not as straightforward as the appealing World Bank definition suggests '...that those who provide environmental services should be compensated for doing so and that those who receive the services should pay for their provision.' (Pagiola and Platais, 2002) 'Double dividends' in terms of environmental benefits combined with poverty reduction as a result of payments for environmental services are not easily achieved. Trade-offs exist and ask for maximum clarity in the hierarchy of objectives. Aiming to further improve the effectiveness of PES and based on the results of our assessment, we will be intensifying the dialogue with partner countries targeting its use more clearly and defining more specifically the role development co- operation should play."Conference Paper The Asian Development Bank: A Promoter of Good Governance in Its Hydropower Development Projects? Case Study Theun Hinboun Hydropower Project in Laos(2004) Jusi, Sari"The paper will explore the role and challenges related to the role of Asian Development Bank in environmental governance, with a particular focus on hydropower project management, casestudy Theun Hinboun Hydroelectric Power Project in Lao PDR. One of the key research questions of this paper is how ADB can translate the rhetoric and the aspirations of sustainable human development, poverty reduction, environmental protection and participation into action through Bank's hydropower projects? The preparation of this paper has involved analyses of reports related to the Theun Hinboun hydropower project, national plans and documents of Lao PDR, ADB-documents, interviews of representatives of key stakeholders at all levels in Laos and Thailand, and analyses of secondary literature of the subject to unpack the research dilemma. This paper aims to contribute to the broader debate on the role of multinational funding agencies in the development of natural resources in developing countries."Conference Paper The Participative Management of Water through Basins in Mexico: Lack of Experience or Final Failure?(2004) Mollard, Eric; Vargas, Sergio"Negotiations around divergent interests concerning the distribution of water in the Lerma-Chapala river basin are among the most advanced ones in Mexico. More than ten years after the first agreements and the creation of a river basin committee, negotiation is going through a period of stagnation. "This communication firstly recalls how the negotiations are embedded in the decentralization policy engaged by President Carlos Salinas de Gortari's government in 1992. Then, we detail the actors, their strategy and their interactions within the basin committee and within the whole framework of governability, which characterizes natural resource management in Mexico. Lastly, we discuss the assumptions of institutional inconsistency, social practices resulting from the past, weak environmental culture, and constraints of situation (electoral calendar, water shortage). Finally, on the basis of the actors' performance within the context of contemporary Mexico, the authors propose a double political reading. The first one deals about 'politicization' of water where no dialogue is possible without a really autonomous representatineness of users in the river basin council. Obstructions to dialogue by some powerful stakeholders would result, in a second reading, from the absence of some conditions of governability, be the framework of regulation participative or not. These minimal conditions are not specific to water management but include the whole policies of natural resource management. "Social participation became a current issue during the last few years in the international, national and local agendas. Everyone defends this idea, from researchers and NGO to politicians and citizens. This quasi-unanimity mirrors the legitimate aspiration of each of us to be heard, whereas this democratic practice is also judged to be an effective means to bring a groups decision closer to social request, local interest, and finally, common good. Additionally, social participation produces legitimacy, so that institutions and elected representatives are strengthened. "Not only we (the authors) do not call these postulates into question, but we consider that, for Mexico, which leaves several decades of authoritarianism and experiences, during this transition period, an unprecedented crisis of confidence, such a participative democracy is the only way to rebuild confidence, credibility, and legitimacy towards institutions and representatives. "However, the analysis of a participative experience in designing a regional policy for natural resources management highlights gaps for public action. These gaps can occur from the capacity to make a negotiated decision, at the moment of decision enforcement or later with turmoil by the most affected group. The first condition is general when we deal about social participation, whereas the second one is specific to the Mexican context."Conference Paper Institutional Options for Sustainable Irrigation: An Evidence from Bulgaria(2004) Penov, Ivan"This paper investigates a local problem of common pool resources (CPR), the solution of which needs a balance between the collective and private interests. In the political context we have a large group of actors with a short planning horizon and a lack of trust among them. CPR provision is organised in a centralised way. The state enforcement mechanism is weak and cannot protect the individuals or eventually back the collective decisions. The above problem is investigated in the case of irrigation in Bulgaria where water usage declined by nearly 85% during the period of transition. In addition, large parts of the existing canal systems were abandoned. Three groups of institutional options are investigated in the paper: improvement of the local level co- ordination; limiting the market imperfections, and strengthening the external conflict resolution and sanctioning mechanisms. The investigation of the above case led the author to conclusions that can be generalised for the case of CPR management during the period of transition. The transition process is not just a process of transferring western institutions to Eastern Europe, but also a process of spontaneous emerging of new institutions at local level. Therefore, we call for state intervention, not in the area of CPR provision, but in supporting local co-ordination."Conference Paper Resolving Water Conflicts through Participatory Decision Making: A Case Study from the Nakanbé River Basin, Burkina Faso(2004) Kibi, Nlombi"Water's importance for socio-economic development cannot be over emphasised. Not only is it key for human survival and welfare, but it is also an essential resource in agriculture (land irrigation, farming, breeding), health, hydroelectricity and industrial production for which there are no substitutes. Unfortunately, in Burkina Faso divergent economic, political, and social interests, the absence of adequate rules governing its use, and the lack of dialogue between the different players and stakeholders, have resulted in frequent conflicts between water users. "Over the course of the last two decades, it has become clear that managing conflict is essential to the sustainable management of common-pool resources, such as water. One approach towards managing water conflicts is the Integrated Water Resources Management Approach by Watershed Basin (IWRMA), which uses participatory approaches to help resolve conflict. The IWRMA refers to a system of decisions and actions about water restoration and conservation. Recent research supports the notion that the IWRMA is perhaps the only approach that is able to efficiently integrate all stakeholders, as well as structural (economic, social, legal) and environmental factors, into the decision-making process (McNitt and Kepford, 1999; Petersen, 1999; in Black, P.E., 1996). "This paper present the main results of a project, sponsored by IDRC from 1998 to 2003, which employed a participatory methodology for resolving water conflicts in the case of 19 villages in the Nakanbé River Basin, Burkina Faso. In these villages, especially at handpumps, intense water conflicts arose between women and girls or between women, girls and stockbreeders because of the waters insufficiency for all users. These conflicts often resulted in disputes or quarrels between two or more end- users. The Participatory Decision-Making Aid Approach divided the conflict resolution process into ten steps and involved all stakeholders in mediation activities such as informal discussions, roundtable discussions, meetings and forum discussions, and theatrical representations. The solutions, proposed and implemented with the involvement of all stakeholders (mainly grassroots stakeholders) fell into three distinct categories: 1) technical solutions, 2) solutions aimed at changing mentalities, behaviours and taboos of the local population about water use and water conflicts, and 3) solutions related to restructuring water management committees. The result of these grassroots-initiated interventions has been fewer water conflicts between users around water handpumps in the majority of villages and the increasing of the villagers' autonomy with regards to the management of the water supply. The Participatory Decision-Making Aid Approach holds promise as a conflict resolution mechanism for managing conflict in different circumstances and with other common-pool resources such as land and forests."Conference Paper Disturbances and Resilience in Common-Pool Resource Management Systems(2004) Ternström, Ingela"In this paper, I take the analysis of common-pool resource management one step further by looking closely at how the users adapt to different types of disturbances. The analysis provides insights for how to analyze and promote resilience in common-pool resource systems. The main conclusion is that we need to start using a new tool-box if we are to further improve our understanding. I analyze historical data from ten farmer managed irrigation systems in Nepal. By tracing the processes triggered by the most common types of disturbances, I am able to pinpoint the actions that are taken by the users to counter the negative effects of these disturbances. I find that the reactions can be grouped into decision- making, reconstructions activities, rule changes, conflict management and change of leadership or institutions. I also find that many of these activities are undertaken by a few key individuals, the leaders. Furthermore, the main threats to the sustainability of these irrigation systems are disturbances that change the composition of individual users and those that directly affect the institutional structure. This strongly suggests that we start using the tool-box provided by various organizational theories."Conference Paper An Optimal Governance Model of Land Use in Watershed: The Case of the Paldang Reservoir(2004) Kim, Sung-Bae"This study introduces an optimal governance model of land use in watershed areas from a property rights perspective, focusing on the Paldang reservoir in Korea. The particular model is developed based on the premise that land use decisions, which differ in their attributes, can properly be aligned with governance mechanism in such a way that minimizes the governance costs. Given the intrinsic limitations of the measurement of governance costs, this study applies the discrete structural analysis for the alignment. This model developed in such a manner prescribes very diverse and specific governance structures, and as such, the relevance of this model to the real world situation is much greater. The diversification of policy measures also provides the residents in the watershed of Paldang reservoir with the opportunity to develop a series of environmentally sensitive and economically viable patterns for growth and diversity."Conference Paper Owners Escape Unharmed: Activation of Institutional Rules in Rivalries between Heterogeneous Water Users(2004) Aubin, David"The provision of different goods and services from the same natural common-pool resource increases scarcity and threatens renewability. The behaviour of resource users is regulated by various institutional rules, mainly property rights and public policies. These rules are activated in order to defend their own use against others. How do heterogeneous water users solve their rivalries? Our theoretical framework suggests that a resolution of rivalries comesout of a process of activation and confrontation of rules between competing users. We postulate that an owner activates property rights and a non-owner public policies that point him out as a final beneficiary. We retain here two ideal-typical user confrontations: property rights against property rights and property rights against public policies. We advocate that success in the resolution of the rivalry is subject to a specific kind of local arrangement in each case. If two owners confront, then the rivalry is solved through a bilateral agreement, and if an owner confronts with a final beneficiary, then the State compensates the owner for his loss. We test these two hypotheses on four empirical cases in Belgium and Switzerland. What emerges from the analysis is that an owner never loses in a resolution of a rivalry, or not much at all."