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Conference Paper Vertical Collective Action: Addressing Vertical Asymmetries in Watershed Management(2009) Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo; Johnson, Nancy; Rodriguez, Luz Angela"Watersheds have the characteristic of connecting people vertically by water flows, making relationships among users of water more complex. The location of the people along the watershed defines their role in the provision and appropriation of water. Verticality in watersheds thus imposes a challenge to collective action. This paper presents the results of field experiments conducted in four watersheds of two different countries: Colombia (South America) and Kenya (Africa). We recruited around 639 watersheds inhabitants from upstream, midstream and downstream locations in these basins and conducted field experiments to study the role that location and verticality plays in affecting cooperation at the provision and appropriation decisions. Two field experiments were conducted: the 'Irrigation Game' a new experimental design that includes the provision and appropriation nature of the resource, and the 'Water Trust Game' an adaptation of the Trust Game where we explicitly announce the actual location upstream or downstream of the two players. The results show that reciprocity and trust are very important motivations for upstream-downstream cooperation and that the role of upstream players has important implications in water provision decisions. Results from both experiments suggest that the lack of trust from downstream players towards upstream players restricts the possibilities of cooperation among the watershed users."Conference Paper The Prospects for Management of a Fragmented Aquifer by a Divided Farm Community(2009) MacKinnon, Anne"This paper analyzes the factors at play to identify what appears necessary for this community to take collective action to manage its water resource."Conference Paper Water Governance and State Governance: A Transaction Cost Perspective of China's Unitarianism(2009) Wang, Yahua"Unitarianism (da yi tong) is both an important characteristic of Chinese civilization and a key to understanding it, yet there are still issues about China's unitarianism that remain a puzzle. The theory of the water governance school as represented by Karl Mark, Karl Wittfogel and Ray Huang is perhaps the most useful explanation of why China embarked on unitarianism more than 2000 years ago. This paper attempts to deduce this theory by using the transaction cost approach, and constructing a choice model of governance structure based on the relevant literature. Using the framework of this model, the paper adopts historical materials as evidence for the structure choice in China's water governance and then explains how the hierarchical structure of water governance led to a unitary empire, and how it can be used to interpret the mechanism of the formation, operation and disintegration of China's unitarianism. The study suggests a move away from a unitary system towards a federal system of state governance in contemporary China."Conference Paper Institutionalizing Design Principles in the Irrigation Management Improvement Projects in Nepal(2009) Pradhan, Prachanda"Self-governing irrigation organizations have, more or less, imbibed the design principles. The performance of the irrigators organization with the features of the design principles is reported to be satisfactory to the clients of the irrigation systems. "Effort will be made in this presentation to examine not what has happened in the adoption of the design principles in the irrigators organization, but try to analyze how Asian Development Bank funded project on 'Community Managed Irrigated Agriculture Sector Project' (CMIASP) and World Bank funded project on Irrigation and Water Resources Management Project (IWRMP) in Irrigation Management Transfer component in Nepal introduced procedure to strengthen irrigators organization incorporating those design principles identified by Ostrom. "In some irrigators organizations, these principles exist as they evolved over period of time. The issue to examine here is how can these principles be institutionalized with the external midwifery assistance in the newly formed Water Users Associations (WUAS)? What might be complementary and contradictory phenomena when efforts are made to institutionalize those design principles in the new irrigators organization. "Drawing examples from the World Bank and ADB funded projects on irrigation sector as mentioned earlier, procedures to institutionalize design principles will be analyzed and findings will be discussed."Conference Paper Good Governance for the Wadden: The Organisation of Decision-Making for Sustainability(2009) Toonen, Theo A. J."In this essay we will place the problems surrounding the governance of the Wadden Sea in the theoretical perspective of the governance of the Commons (section 2). Working on this basis, we will formulate a number of assumptions to evaluate good governance for the Wadden (section 3). We will then apply these assumptions to a short analysis based on both the information from the file of the Adviesgroep Waddenzeebeleid (AGW) [Advisory Group for the Governance of the Wadden Sea] and on our own observations and experience (section 4). Conclusions and recommendations derived from theory and research of commons management will be given in section 5."Conference Paper Metaphors and Methods for Institutional Synthesis(2009) Bruns, Bryan"In the design space between blueprint panaceas and spontaneous order, what scope is there for deliberate institutional artisanship to apply ideas from institutional analysis and design (IAD) and related social science? "This paper briefly surveys approaches to improving institutional design, focusing on applications for irrigated waterscapes and other contexts of institutional diversity. Concepts such as building, balancing, aligning, crafting, fitting, adapting, improvising, and navigating institutions identify assumptions and opportunities for influencing changes in collective action. Analysis suggests what may be necessary, favorable, vulnerable, feasible, or ideal, but better strategies are needed to foster the synthesis of diverse institutions that are not just workable, but good. The range of approaches available may include not only offering examples, enforcement, funding, technical diagnosis, and facilitation processes, but also expanding options, switching starting points, challenging assumptions, asking about design principles, and appreciative inquiry. Examples from irrigation in northeast Thailand and other parts of Southeast Asia illustrate challenges and opportunities for improving institutional artisanship."Conference Paper The Politics and Economics of 'Fadama' Irrigation and Product Sales in the Tin Mining Areas of the Jos Plateau in Nigeria(2009) Mang, Henry Gyang"This work discusses the transition in the politics and economics of irrigation farming in the Jos area of Plateau state, Nigeria. Examining the former and latter constructions of ownership, use, commerce and authority of land and products of obtained from it. The advent of commercial dry season farming called 'fadama' or 'lambu' in the Plateau area around the 1980's produced a new group of temporary migrants. Itinerant farmers from the far north, who took advantage of the deserted mining ponds in and around Jos, the capital of Plateau state in Central Nigeria. This development saw the periodical use by the mainly Hausa farmers from the far north, of land in the dry season, slowly building a community in consonance with a few settled Fulani. The Fulani's are generally known to be nomads, but in recent years, many have settled mainly in the outskirts of the metropolis or in villages all over the north. A new landlord-tenant relationship emerged, which saw the 'tenants' relating well with their hosts, the autochthonous 'land owners' who initially were quite oblivious of this new mode of irrigation, This relationship lasted until the 1990's when skirmishes and emerging interests of the autochthons groups brought conflict between the two groups."Conference Paper Context and Institutions in Irrigation Management: Applicability of Design Principles in Nepal and Thailand(2009) Bastakoti, Ram Chandra; Shivakoti, Ganesh P."In this paper we assess the applicability of design principles (Ostrom, 1990) in irrigation management comparing the similarities and differences from Nepal and Thailand (considering the difference in economic situation and nature of irrigation systems). The information comes from the empirical study of 100 irrigation systems, 50 each from Nepal and Thailand representing major river basins and ecological regions in both countries. The results showed that most of the design principles proposed by Ostrom are applicable in irrigation management in Nepal and Thailand. But the level of applicability of each design principles varied across these two countries. Some of them were fully and mostly applicable in both countries. But others were more applicable only in one country, and rarely applicable in another. It was especially due to the difference in the irrigation infrastructure, besides other reasons. Design principle two 'congruence' and design principle five 'graduate sanctions'; could not fully capture the existing institutional settings. We have proposed some modifications for wider applicability in the specific conditions."Conference Paper Contracts versus Trust in Water Allocation: Growing & Sharing the Pie in Northeast Brazil(2009) Pfaff, Alexander; Velez, Maria Alejandra"We explore the efficiency and equity resulting from allocation of a fixed resource within a bargaining institution, using a modification of the Ultimatum Game with asymmetric productivity and a surplus-sharing step that permits us to explore trust. Sharing allows pie division independent of pie growth. We use generically framed experiments based on water allocation in NE Brazil with 570 participants in Ceara, in Fortaleza (the capitol) or the Jaguaribe (largest agricultural) Valley. These areas are soon to be further connected by a large canal to bring water towards Fortaleza. Our games have 3 steps: [1] proposers request a resource amount; [2] responders accept that split or reject it, yielding a low default payment for all; and [3] if that proposal was accepted, proposers choose whether to send back some of the gains. We consider three institutional designs distinguished by levels of communication. In 'No Communication', a benchmark, and in 'Message' where the proposer sends a non-binding written message about 3rd-step sharing conditional upon acceptance, we see evidence of 2nd-step trust (acceptance of less than the default) that pays off. Yet when that sharing message is a binding 'Contract', efficiency and equity rise."Conference Paper From Power Misuse to Leadership in Bulgaria's Irrigation Sector(2009) Theesfeld, Insa"Irrigated water and irrigation infrastructure are common-pool resources. Common-pool resource scholars have advocated taking distributional aspects and power relations into account when analyzing institutional change in common-pool resource management. The way benefits are distributed among various actors is decisive, and the respective political weight of the latter can influence the likelihood of institutional change. When social dilemmas are solved and new rules implemented, some people benefit more than others. Indeed, some may even benefit at the expense of others. Empirical evidence from Bulgaria supports the view that local actors use power asymmetries to maintain their benefits. Ostrom (2007, p.190) points out that, in contrast to the early stages in a process of collective action, inequalities in distribution of benefits may, however, reduce trust and cooperation later in the process. "In the empirical part of this paper, I will highlight the incongruity between formal and effective rules as a transition-typical feature and one environmental determinant for the evolving of destructive leadership. The empirical material highlights that the incongruity of rules enables heterogeneous participants to misuse power asymmetries and, thus, maintain opportunistic strategies. Thereafter, I will present direct empirical evidence for low level of trust in formal actors and perception of corruption. This is typical for an environment where destructive leadership can evolve. "Regarding these empirical results, the paper continues to discuss the need of some heterogeneity, such as the appearance of well-educated and connected leaders to start the process of local cooperation. Yet, the remaining challenge is how to facilitate leadership in early stages of a collective action process without encouraging power misuse of individuals at a later stage."