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Conference Paper 'That's Not Right': Resistance to Enclosure in Newfoundland Fisheries(1995) McCay, Bonnie J."The option of quasi-privatization of fisheries, or individual fishery quotas, is one case among many involving the use of market mechanisms to help manage common pool resources. As a Beijer Institute working group has emphasized, it is very challenging to develop market-based systems that not only achieve economic goals such as efficiency but also deal with distributional equity in ways that help foster resource stewardship. This paper reports on recent field research among Newfoundland fishers who are on the verge of adopting privatized fishing quotas but are resisting this change in property rights, as well as those who adopted such a system but with stringent limitations. The case study is part of an attempt to identity the role of 'community' and related social and cultural factors in resistance to enclosure of the commons."Conference Paper Flexible Quotas as a Device in Fisheries Management: A Control System Based on Progressive Taxation(1995) Berglann, Helge"This paper introduces a new fisheries management scheme that might give a substantial improvement in rational fishery's exploitation. We have named it the 'flexible quota' system and it is based on the ideas to implement an individual progressive taxation for each vessel. The purpose of this taxation is to control total catch, and to make this system acceptable for the fishermen, the tax should be paid back to the fishermen. This pay out should be formed as a cash payment independent of the actual catch for each vessel, and should come from a cash register that is common for a certain number of vessels. This cash register is a part of a system organized as a number of hierarchical levels where the higher levels control the level beneath it subject to the same principle as the lower levels. In this outline of a pay back model, it will not make any difference for the control whether the fishermen work together or not, and a culture where cheating is improper can grow up. Numerical investigations with a model that embodies a logistic function for the recruitment of fish, and a simple harvest- and cost function, shows that progressive taxation both have better static and dynamic qualities than equivalent linear taxation. The investigations show further that there re two kinds of favorable choices for the degree of progressivity in the management scheme. Either the degree of progressivity should be small (but not too close to be linear), or it should be large. A small degree of progressivity generates more short-term profit, while more long-term profit can be initiated with a large degree of progressivity. Bad influence on the system from fluctuations in fish stocks, costs and prices can be avoided by omitting some medium choice of the degree of progressivity."Conference Paper Fisheries Co-management in Bangladesh: Experiences with GO-NGO-Fisher Partnership Models(1995) Ahmed, Mahfuzuddin; Capistrano, Doris; Hossain, Mokammel"Failure in the past to ascertain responsible fishing practices and equitable distribution of benefits under traditional leasing systems has motivated the Bangladesh government to work in partnership with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and fishing communities in recent times. Several models of interactions between governmental organizations (GO), NGOs and fishing communities have emerged out of the partnerships. This paper discusses the operational approaches that were used to identify the fishery commons and create institutions for increasing the participation of local fishers in the making and enforcing resource use rules. The group-based empowerment strategies of NGOs; their role in securing for the beneficiaries the access rights to waterbodies as well as provision of credits and inputs for employment and income generation activities showed some practical evidence of the concept of the poor as managers of the fisheries resources. The paper also discusses the policy issues involving the rights held by local community members to catch fish for subsistence purposes; practices and uses that affect the physical environment. There are also issues associated with the difficulties of reconciling differing government (GO) and NGO priorities and points of view with regard to target group identification and levels of responsibilities. The paper concludes that a non-obstructionist policy context and interests of the powerful groups as well as those dependent on the fishery resources are the critical factors for successful evolution of co-management models in countries like Bangladesh."Conference Paper Fisheries Management in Post-Communist Poland: Prospects of User-Group Participation(1995) Marciniak, Boguslaw; Jentoft, Svein**Paper was subsequently published as "Burning Bridges? Polish Fisheries Co-operatives in Times of Transition" in Maritime Anthropological Studies (MAST), 4(2):72-86. "In the wake of the transition from communism to capitalism, the structure of the Polish fishing industry radically changed. The heavy-weight state fisheries sector is dismantled and privatized. Privatization also left the co-operative sector isolated and vulnerable. Without government support and with their confederative institutions abolished, their role as co-manager was severely limited relative to the situation that prevailed under communist rule. The small scale private sector, while obtaining more freedom under the new regime, still suffers from minimal fish-quotas and lack of government assistance. "To become influential in fisheries management Polish fishermen are in need of collective organizations that can broker their concerns and interests vis-a-vis government, and they have experiences from traditional institutions to draw upon. In some communities along the Baltic coast, the traditional (pre World War II) forms of co-management institutions - the so-called 'maschoperias' - still exists. What are the prospects of revitalization of these traditional management institutions now that the state sector has vanished and the co-operative sector is near to collapsing? What conditions, external as well as internal to their communities, may enhance the role 'maschoperias' in Polish fisheries management? The data presented in this paper is gathered from fishing communities and 'maschoperias' in Kashubian region of Baltic Poland."Conference Paper Herding the Coastal Commons; Or How to Manage Cod as Livestock(1995) Aarset, Bernt"During the last 20 years explicit management of marine fish stocks has become ubiquitous for fisheries nations across the world. Fisheries management is concerned with the transformation of scientific advice on optimum sustainable yield into functional policy through direct control of harvesting intensity and pattern. Stock enhancement is a logical extension of this idea. Here one tries to increase the output of a given stock by supplementing reared juveniles when natural recruitment is low, or by channeling more of the energy flow through desired species. In this paper I will discuss institutional and organizational problems that must be solved if the enhancement is going to be transformed from an interesting idea to practical reality."Conference Paper Who Should Have a Voice in Management of Local Marine Resources? Some Comments on the Common Property Debates and the Decision of Co-Management Institutions for North Norwegian Fjord Fisheries(1995) Eythorsson, Einar"Formalized self-management of the cod-fisheries in Lofoten was established by law in 1897, along with some local regulations in the North-Norwegian fjords. In 1959, the fjord regulations were delegated to the regional branches of the Fishers Union. "Today, it is no longer self-evident that local management should be an exclusive domain of the Fisheries Department and the Fishers Union. Traditional fjord fishing, which used to be the main component of the economical adaptation of coast-sami communities, is in decline. At the same time, the discourse on local management is changing, partly as a result of modernization processes in rural communities, growth of aquaculture and recreational fishing. Salmon farming, and domestication of marine species demands appropriation of common sea-space. Moreoever, ethnic mobilization among the Coast Sami has changed the agenda, as the Sami Parliament claims native rights on behalf of Sami fjord fishers. "The scientific discourse is also changing, as the Fisheries Research Institute in Tromso has made research on fjord ecosystems a priority. Marine biologists have come to believe that cod and haddock in these areas belong to local spawning stocks, which could be managed separately. Environmental conservation is becoming an issue in local fisheries management. A task force has forwarded a conservation plan for marine areas, in order to protect vital biotopes in fjord-ecosystems. Management is thus becoming increasingly complex, with new lines of conflict and disparate interest-groups. The challenge is how to integrate the concerns of conservation, ethnopoltics, aquaculture, recreation, and commercial fishing. However, lessons from existing management practices should be useful in a process of designing a new co-management system for the fjords."Conference Paper Te Tiriti/Treaty, Power and the Fish: The Dynamics of Dispossession(1995) Dawson, Richard"This paper gives one interpretation of the politico-economic evolution of the fisheries in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The focus is on the Crown's failure to give effect to its guarantee to Iwi (ribes) of 'te tino rangatiratanga [...] o ratau toanga katoa' (the highest chieftainship of prized possessions) and 'full exclusive and undisturbed possession' of their fisheries promised in Te Tiriti/Treaty. Section 1 outlines the way in which the Maori and Pakeha parties to the contests are perceived and identified. Section 2 states how the contests may be framed, albeit with some difficulty, in Euro-centric politico-economic terms of rights and property. Section 3 fives a broad outline of the significance of fish in traditional Iwi life. Section 4 presents a sequence of events preceding Te Tiriti/Treaty so as to illuminate the circumstances and various possible reasons, motivations, and intentions, which led to Te Tiriti/Treaty. Section 5 examines aspects of the two texts of Te Tiriti/Treaty and the process whereby signatures were sought. Section 6 provides an account of various post-Te Tiriti/TReaty power contests up until the mid-to-late 1860s. Finally, Section 7 looks at the evolving status of Te Tiriti/Treaty fishing rights."Conference Paper Decision-making Processes in the Management of Coastal Commons: Case Studies from the Caribbean(1995) Thebaud, Olivier; Renard, Yves"The paper focuses on Coastal Zone Management issues in the small Caribbean islands of Martinique and Saint-Lucia, and underlines the importance of understanding decision-making processes in the implementation of collective measures to regulate the access to and use of coastal resources. The two islands appear to face similar problems linked to the increase and diversification of the demand for these resources. Multiple activities, particularly tourism and leisure activities, have developed in recent years, both on land and at sea, together with growing urbanization and the concentration of communication infrastructures in the sea shore. Despite new and strengthened public regulations, there appears to be an increase in the number of conflictual situations, and a growing need for more efficient collective management of the coastal areas. "Reference is made to a study led in Martinique in 1993 under an IFREMER (Institut Francais de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer) research programme concerning coastal conflicts analysis, and to the work done by CANARI (Caribbean Natural Resources Institute) in both the analysis of conflicts and the provision of assistance in the definition of a regional management program for the district of Soufriere in Saint-Lucia. In the case of Martinique, the study showed that effective management of coastal areas as public property on the island did not result of integrated decision making, more or less efficiently implemented through a single decision-maker's actions, but rather of simultaneous interactions between different actors involved in coastal use. This has led to situations of free access and conflicts, which are managed through locally devised, collective regulation systems, following general public land management principles. The case of Soufriere, where a specific institutions integrating local activities into a collective regulation system was created, gives an illustration of the negotiation process and problems encountered in the tackling the establishment of practical rules of access to and use of coastal resources."Conference Paper Preserving Community Interests under Fisheries Enclosure(1995) Townsend, Ralph E."The adoption of 'rights-based fishing' as the basis for management of fisheries involves the enclosure of common property. Although there are often good efficiency grounds for moving to private property, this enclosure transfers property from the community to private owners. Institutions could be devised in which decision making is governed by private property institutions, but in which the broader community continues to share in the benefits produced by the resource. The usual proposal to accomplish this has been to require lease or royalty payments by resource users, but such payments (especially to central governments) are politically unpopular. This paper instead proposes the creation of fisheries governance corporations with both private and public stockholders. These public stockholders might be local governments or local service institutions, such as hospitals, schools, or port authorities. By exercising its share rights, the local public owners continue to have input into the governance of the resource and continue to receive benefits, perhaps in the form of lease payments for use of the publicly-held fishing rights. Because the public ownership continues to be at a local level, this form of joint public-private governance is more consistent with many traditional institutions of common property governance than various forms of control by a national government."Conference Paper Commons of the North Atlantic Coasts(1995) Sandberg, Audun"Aquaculture, Sea-ranching and Salmon River enhancement are all modern activities that are heavily dependent on one fundamental marine resource - the clean and healthy coastal environment. To understand fully the function of the coast as a commons, it is necessary with an inquiry of the normative foundations for present European resource management institutions - a task which several of the papers in this session aim at. This particular paper analyses the interaction between different resource utilisation systems on North Atlantic Coasts - in particular on Norwegian Coasts. In the multi-layer governing of these northern coastal environments there is one type of governing institutions for the use of healthy coastal ecology for aquaculture - in closed pens - with limited participation by local government There are other governing institutions for the wild salmon that migrates through the coastal waters on its way between the ocean and its spawning river. There are again other governing institutions for fish-fry areas, for underwater parks, for sea-bird nesting areas and for various categories of coastal fishing areas. With advanced plans for the release of thousands of fish fry in sea-ranching schemes and through various enhancement efforts, like artificial reefs in coastal areas, new questions of rights as basis for new institutions arises. These shed interesting light on old questions of property rights and on the role of local communities, of professional organisations and of the role of the State in its various forms. "From this, the paper contributes to the development of theories that can explain emerging points of convergence between a governing of resources based on 'folk science' and a management of resources based on 'scientific science.'"