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Book Chapter Multiorganizational Arrangements and Coordination: An Application of Institutional Analysis(Walter de Gruyter, 1986) Ostrom, Elinor; Kaufmann, F. X.; Majone, G.; Ostrom, Vincent"Two linked action situations are examined in this chapter using the method of Institutional analysis previously described in Chapter 22. The first arena is the one in which public officials are elected. The most influential model of this arena was developed by Anthony Downs. The second arena is the one in which elected officials bargain with the heads of administrative agencies (sponsors) over the amount of the budget to be allocated and the amount and type of goods or services to be produced. William Niskanen developed an important model of this process. The central question addressed in this chapter is how multiple organizations, competing according to sets of rules, tend to enhance the responsiveness of public officials and bureau chiefs to the preferences of the citizens they serve in both of these arenas. Empirical evidence supporting the proposition that competition among potential producers of a public good will enhance performance is presented related to the provision of solid waste removal services in American cities."Book Chapter Belgium(Overseas Development Institute, 1998) Veron, Philippe; Federspiel, Michèle; Shepherd, Gill; Brown, D.; Richards, Michael; Schreckenberg, K."Two thousand years ago, most of Belgium was covered by natural forest. The main formations were the oak and birch woods which covered la Campine, the Atlantic oak forests of Central Belgium, and the hornbeam, oak and beech forests of Upper Belgium. First the Gauls cleared patches of forest to practise cultivation and animal husbandry, then the Romans built roads through the forests and made it more accessible."Book Chapter Enabling Policy Frameworks for Successful Community Based Resource Management Initiatives(East-West Center and Regional Community Forestry Training Center, 2001) Suryanata, Krisnawati; Dolcemascolo, Glenn; Fisher, Robert; Fox, Jefferson; Suryanata, Krisnawati; Dolcemascolo, Glenn; Fisher, Robert; Fox, Jefferson"The workshop is the ninth in a series on 'Community-Based Management of Forestlands'. Since 1986, the Ford Foundation and the East-West Center have attempted to document the changes taking place in the management of Asia's forests as national governments collaborate with local communities and civil society to design win-win land management scenarios. The workshops have engaged key actors in dialogue and debate over new policies and practices. These brief sabbaticals provided an opportunity for forestry practitioners to assess and anticipate these changes within their countries, and to compare their experience with other national efforts. The writing workshops are also an important venue for busy practitioners to the take time to reflect upon and document their experience for wider analysis and sharing. The 2001 writing workshop brought together fifteen participants from eight countries. These people have all been involved in promoting collaborative approaches to environmental management. Though emphasis is generally on forestland management, this year's workshop was expanded to include irrigation management (papers by Pangare, Parajuli and Tan KimYong) because of the long history of institutional development in the management of irrigation resources. In all cases, participants are operating within a policy framework that espouses varying degrees of decentralization. Although decentralization holds the promise of administrative efficiency and more equitable distribution of benefits (Cheema and Rondinelli 1983), many decentralization efforts have neither empowered local communities nor improved forest management. Agrawal and Ribot (1999) have argued that, in order to realize many of the lauded benefits of decentralization, powers need to be transferred to lower level actors who are both elected and downwardly accountable. Empirical analyses of the lines of accountability are key to our understanding of the nature of decentralization and community-based resource management initiatives. Equally important is an examination of the conditions that facilitate downward accountability such as policy environments and local socio-political institutions."Book Chapter Population and Forest Dynamics in the Hills of Nepal: Institutional Remedies by Rural Communities(Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, 1999) Varughese, George"Projections of massive declines in Himalayan forest cover and dire predictions for the future of forests in Nepal initiated worldwide concern in the 1970s. Initially, the source of the problem was seen as domestic fuelwood use compounded by rapid population growth. Then expansion of agriculture, commercial logging, and tourism were blamed. However, the actual rates of deforestation, as well as its causes and consequences, remain very much in question. Studies indicate that while there is degradation from overharvesting in the hills, the total loss of forest cover has been relatively small. Others argue that losses have even been reversed in both forest area and tree density. Still others contend that while forest area is not decreasing in the hills, the quality of existing forests is suspect."Book Chapter Considerations on Governing Heritage as a Commons Resource(Springer, 2017) Gould, Peter G."The 'commons' is gaining attention as a possible alternative model for managing tangible and intangible heritage in a manner that devolves authority and responsibility to local communities through mechanisms that are democratic and privilege local over national or global interests. This chapter reviews the literature on the commons within archaeology and heritage management, evaluates theorizing on the commons in the context of heritage, and explores, through literature review and case studies from Belize and Peru, the challenges and opportunities that arise should archaeologists and heritage managers seek to adopt the commons as a guiding principle for community projects. The chapter emphasizes that the problem of governance—the rules under which the competing interests of stakeholders in a venture manage their activities and resolve their differences—is an underappreciated but critical ingredient in the design of effective commons-like models for heritage management."Book Chapter Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons (Draft)(MIT Press, 2005) Hess, Charlotte; Ostrom, Elinor"Who hasn't heard of the six blind men of Indostan encircled around an elephant? The six-one a political scientist, one a librarian, one an economist, one a law professor, one a computer scientist, and one an anthropologist-discover, based on their own investigations, that the object before them is a wall, spear, a snake, a tree, a fan, and a rope. The story fits well with the question that propelled this chapter: how can an interdisciplinary group of scholars best analyze a highly complex, rapidly evolving, elephantine resource such as knowledge? Trying to get one's hands around knowledge as a shared resource is even more challenging when we factor in the economic, legal, technological, political, social and psychological components-each complex in their own right-that make up this global commons."Book Chapter Toward Specificity in Complexity: Understanding Co-Management from a Social Science Perspective(Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003) Pinkerton, Evelyn; Wilson, Douglas C.; Nielsen, Jesper Raakjaer; Degnbol, Poul"The term 'fisheries co-management' has now been so broadly used in applied settings and in social science that it risks losing important aspects of its original thrust. In addition, as social science thinking about management in general has evolved over the last two decades, we have all refined and enriched the way we see this concept. For the concept to remain useful, I argue that it should become more specific and complex instead of more general and generic. In the discussion below I attempt to reevaluate, and reorganize a few key dimensions of this term into a form that is more theoretically useful for dealing with complexity. I use the evolution of my own research and thinking on fisheries co-management over the last 15 years as a means of attempting to hone and revitalize the term. Also, in dialogue with colleagues, I suggest key alternative perspectives about what meaning we should assign the phrase."Book Chapter Financial Transfers to Sustain Cooperative International Optimality in Stock Pollutant Abatement(Edward Elgar, 1998) Germain, Marc; Toint, Philippe; Tulkens, Henry; Faucheux, S.; Gowdy, J.; Nicolai, I."It is well known that the transnational character of many environmental problems (for example, greenhouse gas emissions, acid rain, pollution of international waters) requires cooperation among the countries involved if a social optimum is to be achieved. The issues raised thereby have often been addressed, in the economic literature, using concepts borrowed from cooperative game theory."Book Chapter People's Struggles for Water Rights over Kelo River Waters(Routledge, 2007) Kashwan, Prakash; Sharma, Ramesh Chandra; Joy, K. J.; Gujja, B.; Paranjape, S.; Goud, V.; Vispute, S."At issue is the permission granted by the Chhattisgarh government (GoC) to Jindal Strips Limited, now called Jindal Steel and Power Limited (JSPL), to extract water through a combination of stop dams and intake wells from the Kelo, downstream of Raigarh town. According to the local population and activists, fourteen villages of Raigarh district in Chhattisgarh and nine villages in Orissa are affected, causing loss of livelihood, pollution of drinking water and increased drudgery for women. A writ petition against JSPL has been filed in the High Court of Chhattisgarh."Book Chapter Chapter 3: Foundational Aspects of Polycentric Governance: Overarching Rules, Social-problem Characteristics and Hheterogeneity(Cambridge University Press, 2019) Thiel, Andreas; Moser, Christine"In this chapter, we address what we consider some foundational components shaping emergent polycentric governance that can help to explain the scalar organisation and diversity of governance arrangements we encounter as well as their performance. First, we argue that polycentric governance is founded on particular overarching rules, which enable self-organization by providers, producers, consumers and citizens involved in governance of collective goods. Second, polycentric governance draws together a diversity of ways to address the social problems, along with their characteristics and performance criteria, that involved actors bring into negotiations over governance. Variability in social problem characteristics consequently leads to variable governance structures and levels of performance. Third, heterogeneity of communities (e.g. in terms of income, education, values) engaged in polycentric governance can provide further insights regarding why people prioritize certain performative aspects of governance in relation to different criteria and, therefore, seek to realize their aims through a diversity of governance arrangements. This chapter elaborates on the foundational roles these variables play in shaping polycentric governance and highlights existing research gaps regarding key issues related to them."